The Crown, The Treaty and The Hauraki Tribes

1880-1980

THE HAURAKI

TREATY CLAIMS

VOLUME 6

Hauraki Maori Trust Board

The Crown, the Treaty,

and the Hauraki Tribes, 1880–1980

ROBYN ANDERSON

HAURAKI MAORI TRUST BOARD

1997

First published in 1997 by
Hauraki Maori Trust Board
PO Box 33, Paeroa
Aotearoa New Zealand

ISBN 1-877198-04-8
© Hauraki Maori Trust Board

This report was commissioned by the Hauraki Maori Trust Board
as part of its Waitangi Tribunal Claim research programme.
Any views expressed and conclusions drawn are those of the author.

All rights reserved.
No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, including photocopying, recording or otherwise,
without the prior permission of the publisher.

Typeset by Wordset Enterprises Limited, Wellington
Printed by GP Print, Wellington, New Zealand

FOREWORD

The Hauraki Treaty Claims project has examined the nature and extent of the interaction of Maori with the Crown in the Hauraki tribal territory during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The claims, together with the research and supporting evidence, are set out in II volumes. These are presented to the Waitangi Tribunal to support the Hauraki case.

The history of colonisation in Hauraki—the social and economic deprivation endured by those who have gone before us and their years of responsible protest—has not been told before. These volumes, the foundation of the Hauraki case, will forever rewrite our nation's history books, contributing, only now, a Maori perspective to the history of this region.

We began this project four years ago with a multi–disciplinary team approach. Dr Anderson was part of this team. As a historian she examined the political relationship between Maori and the Crown. Her overview spans two reports. The first dealt with the period up to the 1880s. This second report commences in the 1880s and concludes in modern times. It draws on the themes emerging from the detailed block history analysis in Volume 8.

Dr Anderson's The Crown, The Treaty, and the Hauraki Tribes, 1880–1980 examines the

Crown's systematic dismantling of the original agreements it made with Maori and the laws it contrived to alienate Maori land. The relentless pace of land loss continued during this period. By 1912 only 13% of the Hauraki tribal territory remained Maori land—today that proportion has reduced to 2.6%. This report documents one of the worst cases of Maori landlessness in New Zealand.

Dr Anderson's report describes how Maori interests were sacrificed to make way for the development of natural resources—minerals, timber, wetlands, rivers, land and foreshore—and the infrastructure supporting growing Hauraki settlements. Land was taken for drainage schemes, river improvements, settlement schemes, railways, roads, and town development. The promise of partnership, with social and economic betterment for Maori, did not materialise.

Also documented is the struggle to gain redress: the petitions of the 1880s to the 1950s; the MacCormick Inquiry in the 1930; and High Court action and negotiations over the resident site licences on ceded lands in the 1980.

This report includes initiatives people today remember such as the delegations sent to Wellington and the representations made to the Governments of Fraser, Nash, Holyoake, Marshall, Kirk, Rowling and Muldoon. The 1987 (WAI 100) treaty claim follows these actions in the long sequence of attempts to gain justice, to deal with nga hara, the grievances, and to put this sadness behind us.

III

Dr Anderson's report will significantly support the Hauraki case in the debate that will inevitably surround the Hauraki claims. I take this opportunity to thank Dr Anderson for her contribution to this project.

No reira, noho ora koutou.

T.J. McEnteer

Claims Manager

Hauraki Maori Trust Board

IV

CONTENTS

FOREWORD    III

PREFACE    VII
INTRODUCTION AND CHAPTER SUMMARY

CHAPTER ONE: GOVERNMENT POLICY AND

MAO RI REACTION, 1880–1890   21

Maori Concerns and Government Reaction    21

1. The search for control: Native Committees and the Native Land Court   22

2.  Public works: friction at 24

Crown Purchasing, 1880–1890   27

1. Introduction .. 27

2.  Te Aroha hot springs and township    31

3. Purchase of the gold field blocks

4.  The purchase of Piako

5.  Summary discussion    53

CHAPTER TWO: CROWN POLICY AND

MAORI ASPIRATION, 1890–1914   55

1. Native Land Laws Commission, 1891

2.  Crown purchase in the Hauraki peninsula lands

3. The impact of court and survey costs in the Hauraki Plains    63

Maori Land Settlement Act 1905

The Stout Ngata Commission   85

CHAPTER THREE: RESERVES AND REMOVAL OF RESTRICTIONS ON ALIENATION, 1880–1909

The Creation of 'Reserves'   91

The Removal of Restrictions: Policy and Practice   93

Removal of Restrictions at Te Aroha, Ohinemuri, Waikawau, and Moehau    101

Conclusion ..   106

CHAPTER FOUR: IMPACT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY                  109

Impact of Mining on Waihou and Ohinemuri Rivers 109

Drainage of the Hauraki Plains    118

CHAPTER FIVE: HAURAKI LAND AND RATES, 1870–1970   129
CHAPTER SIX: HAURAKI IWI AND THE GOLD FIELDS, 1890–1980 141

Administration of Gold Field Revenues, 1885–1900   142

Timber Revenues on Ohinemuri No. 20 F   144

THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION OF HAURAKI MAORI AFTER COLONISATION

FIGURE

Proportion of Hauraki Rangahaua Whanui District Compared to Districts

in New Zealand, 1860939 180

DOCUMENT REPRODUCTION

1.  Tiriti o Waitangi Petition, Hauraki, 1892   78

2.  Tareranui Petition ..   112

PREFACE

My name is Robyn Anderson. I am a Ph.D. graduate from the University of Toronto, Canada. In the past I have written or contributed to the 'Historical Report on Wellington Lands,' a report prepared for the Crown Congress Joint Working Party, 1993; 'Wellington District,' Waitangi Tribunal Rangahaua Whanui Series, 1996; and 'Goldmining: Policy, Legislation, and Administration,' Waitangi Tribunal Rangahaua Whanui Series, 1996.

This report, The Crown, the Treaty, and the Hauraki Tribes, 1880–1980, was commissioned by the Hauraki Maori Trust Board in 1994, and is the result of more than three years of research in which a number of people and organisations have been involved.

A number of researchers have worked on various stages of this project: David Taipari, Suzanne Woodley, Jim McNicolas and Mary Gillingham. This report would not have been possible without the contribution of their work. The same may be said of David Alexander whose work, The Hauraki Tribal Lands, has been incorporated into this overview. Barry Bradley of the Cartographic Art Company and John McEnteer produced the maps. To all these people my many thanks.

Finally, my thanks to the Hauraki Maori Trust Board, and the people whom they represent, for their patience in waiting for the completion of this report.

VII

INTRODUCTION: CHAPTER SUMMARY

Key Themes

This second part of the report, following on from Volume 4 of the Hauraki Treaty Claims, discusses Hauraki's relationship to the Crown from 1880 to 1980. Two major themes underlie this discussion: Hauraki expression of political concerns and aspirations and the Government's response; and the continuing Hauraki land and resource loss, and the role of the Government—as purchaser, legislator, and administrator—within that process.

The first part of the report (The Crown, the Treaty, and the Hauraki Tribes, 1880–1885) discussed the first 50 years of the Crown's relationship to the Hauraki tribes. By the end of this period, the economic and social penetration of the region by the Government-fostered extractive industries of goldmining and timber milling had reached a peak, firmly establishing European settlement and strengthening government intervention in the district. For many Maori, however, and particularly for those based at Thames, Coromandel, and the harbours of the eastern divide of the peninsula, at Whangapoua, Mercury Bay, and Tairua, the choice must have seemed clear: economic blockade, Government harassment, and the sort of poverty experienced by many of the interior communities after the war, or participation in the cash economy and the ongoing prosperity promised by Government agents and local politicians in their persuasions to allow mining, roads, river improvements, land purchase, and settlement.

At first there was an appearance of successful engagement, epitomised by those whanau and individual rangatira fortunate enough to hold rights recognised by the Crown and the Native Land Court in commercially valuable properties—productive gold field, township, and kauri timber blocks. And at this point Maori at Thames were able to exert some influence over the implementation if not the direction of public works policy, insisting on concessions for their agreement to roads going through, and a measure of employment on projects involving their own lands. Cracks were, however, readily apparent in that facade: the lack of any real place for Maori in the national and local political structures of the colony; the lack of consultation about legislation that would have a direct impact on their lands, income, and rangatiratanga; the increasing reliance on land sales as a source of cash; and warnings from Government agents and court officers, themselves, of increasing poverty and landlessness of the Hauraki people.

The 187os were particularly crucial years, in which the activities of James Mackay, as the Government's land purchase officer and major agent in the region, helped tip the balance of power and control decisively into the hands of the European settlers. Having succeeded in opening much of the district to mining and the Crown's jurisdiction, Mackay turned his attention to the acquisition of the freehold, deliberately seeking to undermine the authority of those Hauraki rangatira who attempted to hold onto their lands for the future sustenance of their hapu and iwi. In the space of ten years, the

THE CROWN, THE TREATY, AND THE HAURAKI TRIBES, 1880–1980

Government had managed to purchase over 330,000 acres in the district while holding debts against another 200,000 acres.1 Thus, by 1885, most of the peninsula, gulf islands and blocks on the western shore of the firth had been acquired for the economic advantage of European settlers and speculators, while Maori ability to retain their last large tract of territory—the delta lands of the Waihou and Piako Rivers—was already seriously compromised by old raihana debts.

Over the next three decades the promises of Maori prosperity and 'partnership' in the development of the colony were shown to be a sham. By 1910 most of the damage had been done, and the place of Hauraki had been set at the bottom rung of the socioeconomic order. Negotiation and concession on public works had been shown to be backed by the 'force of law' while the willingness of the Government and public bodies to employ Maori on such projects also proved remarkably short-lived. The mineral and timber assets of lands, the freehold of which was leased but retained by Maori, had been largely exhausted, even by the 1880s, while sales of Ohinemuri and Te Ipu o Moehau prevented Maori from any ongoing participation in the economic benefits of the new mining ventures made possible by further exploration and technological innovation.

An already severely attenuated land base was reduced further; in the 1880s by Crown purchases of A subdivisions of lands initially held back from the large-scale alienations of Ohinemuri, Waikawau, and Moehau; and increasingly, in the 1890s, by Government-endorsed sale of reserves, often to the Crown itself; as earlier official concerns over the rapidity of Hauraki's land loss were seemingly forgotten and legislators undermined the protections placed on the title. These purchases of much of the remaining Maori land in the gold field district were followed in the late 189os, and the 1900s, by the Government's acquisition of the idle 'wastelands' comprising the Hauraki floodplain. The land was quickly stripped of its kahikatea, drained and brought into farm production and close settlement. Thus, by the end of 1912, Hauraki were left with only 171,000 acres, and much of this was on poor soil, degraded by public works, or in blocks too small and undeveloped to provide adequately for the needs of the iwi at that time, let alone an economic resurgence in subsequent years.

The Crown took few steps to give effect to the ideals of partnership and prosperity once Maori had opened their lands to economic exploitation and settlement. To the contrary, with few exceptions, administrations sought to acquire the most valuable of the areas left in Maori ownership, often in response to pressure from local bodies and politicians from whose ranks Maori were excluded. Advocates of the individualisation of native title had made much of the supposed benefits of greater security of tenure and enhanced commercial value of land held under Crown grant, but in fact, Maori owners continued to have restricted access to capital, and were denied the sorts of economic assistance which the Government extended to their Pakeha counterparts. James Carroll noted in 1891, for example, that the Government inhibited Maori progress in farming by excluding them from eligibility for financial assistance to become 'useful settlers'; and by taking on semi-

1 See Lands Purchased and Leased from Natives in the North Island. AJHR 1884, C–2, pp. 5–7.

2

Introduction: Chapter Summary

monopolistic powers to exclude private purchasers and keep the price of land low, which also meant that there was little profit for the sellers to reinvest.2 The Government took advantage of that quasi-monopoly, and of Maori desperate financial need, to insist upon prices well below those sought by vendors. This cannot be seen merely as energetic bargaining on the part of Crown agents. As Oliver points out: 'It is surely beyond dispute that governments, whatever may have been the limits upon their capacity to protect Maori from ... developments [attendant upon colonisation] should not have taken advantage of them and acted in an exploitative manner.'3

Underpinning the continuing transfer of power and of assets into the hands of European Government and settlers in the last quarter of the nineteenth century was the increasing ideological dominance of two precepts: the paramountcy of the 'public good' as an imperative of Government action and of 'equality under the law' as the principle on which New Zealand society should operate. For Maori, however, these ideals were double-edged, threatening past recognition of rights derived from native title and supposedly safeguarded by the Treaty, and those few special protections which had been developed to prevent the wholesale alienation of lands. Thus, 'equality under law' really meant 'equality under common law', and in the case of mining, that the Government should have equal access to Maori-owned as to European land. Requirements for owner consent which had operated in the early years of development were replaced by statutory assertions of the Government's right to control all resources deemed to be of national importance. This move was backed by the argument that Maori landowners were being treated no differently from Pakeha.

Nor did 'equality under law' translate into 'equality of access' to the institutions which made the law. Maori efforts to find a place in the government of the country had been largely rebuffed: the voice of Maori Members of Parliament generally ignored on issues of importance to Hauraki, and political initiatives within the Native Committees and Kotahitanga, perverted to Government perception and purpose. Denied a vehicle in which to give effect either to political aspirations or to the urgent need to exercise some form of practical control over the individual sale of tribal assets, Maori power was limited to largely passive action—not to participate in the court and not to sell—but such a position was decreasingly viable in a world of diminishing access to natural resources, consistent political pressure towards the further opening of cheap native land for settlement, and their growing indebtedness.

A number of sub-themes are given some prominence in the development of this discussion. In terms of the ongoing diminution of Hauraki land resource, the report draws heavily on the block reports of David Alexander found in Volume 8, and concentrates on the period up to the end of 1912, by which stage, Maori were left with only 12% of their original holdings in the district. Particular attention is paid to the transfer of the Hauraki Plains or delta lands out of Maori hands. This loss resulted partly

2 Cited in W.H. Oliver, The Social and Economic Situation of Hauraki Maori after Colonisation, Hauraki Maori Trust Board, Paeroa, 1997, p. 18; see also p. 35.

3   Ibid, pp. 16–17.

3

THE CROWN, THE TREATY, AND THE HAURAKI TRIBES, 1880–1980

from their growing indebtedness (stemming initially from raihana payments in the 1870s, followed by large court and survey costs as complex issues of native title were bitterly fought out in the late 1880s and 1890s), and thereafter, from the Government's development of an extensive drainage and 'improvement' scheme for the area, resulting in a number of key acquisitions under public works and general land legislation in the first decade of the twentieth century. Some emphasis is given, too, to the Government's continuing efforts to acquire blocks with the most valuable sub-surface resources or best commercialpotential in order to forestall private purchase and to control development, to protect existing capital investment, and in response to the demands of local bodies and Pakeha settlers and entrepreneurs.

The general theme of Hauraki land loss also encompasses two particular questions which are discussed in some detail in separate chapters: the fate of their reserved lands, and transfer of land as a result of a growing rating burden. The emphasis here, is on the role of the Government as both law-maker and administrator. In the context of reserved lands, it is argued that the trend of legislation was towards making it easier to have prohibitions against sale removed from the title, while the growing predisposition of administrations was, similarly, to give readier approval to the freeing up of such lands to purchase. The question of the impact of rating legislation on Hauraki forms a final thread of discussion on the transfer of land resource into Government and Pakeha hands. The report traces a history of conflicting perception and interpretation of the responsibilities of Maori landowners in the payment of rates and development of an infrastructure of roads, water-supply, hospitals, and related works and services. Again, the trend in the twentieth century was one of diminishing recognition of the special circumstances and needs of Maori land owners: of bringing Maori land into the same position as that owned by Pakeha, and in the case of Thames, for the Government administration to give approval for transfer of properties, at a cheap price, into the hands of the local borough council in order to cover an accumulated rates debt.

Issues relating to minerals and sub-surface resources have continued to play an important role in the relationship between Hauraki iwi and the Crown up to the present day, and form a second important theme within the following discussion. The decline in the position of Hauraki in this context involved more than the alienation of the freehold of those blocks still generating a little income in the form of mining rents and fees. Particular emphasis is placed on the Government's exercise of its legislative powers which tended to the marginalisation of the status of the early cession agreements in terms of both the mining revenues to be received by Maori owners and their ability to withhold their lands from the Government's jurisdiction. The underpinnings of that legislative trend were a strengthened assertion of the Crown's prerogative over minerals and, again, an appeal to the concept of 'equality under law': that the Government should have equal power to control mining on Maori as on Pakeha land.

The Crown continued to claim jurisdiction over Maori lands which had been brought into the compass of its gold field powers as a result of the negotiated cessions and forced concessions of the late 1860 and 1870s, until 1971 when the Mining Act dismantled that

4

Introduction: Chapter Summary

structure except for resident site licences (discussed at pp. 172–175). Throughout the twentieth century, the Hauraki people continued to question the competency of the Government's implementation of the cession agreements, and the fairness of its dealings with reference to the payment of revenues and acquisition of the freehold of those blocks. The Government's response to this sense of grievance is discussed in the context of the MacCormick Commission of 1938–1939, and the negotiations surrounding the continuing operation of resident site licences under general mining legislation which gave tenants a virtual lease in perpetuity to Maori land at long out-dated rentals.

Chapter I: Government Policy and Maori Reaction, 1880–1890

The first chapter of this report deals with the period 1880–1890. The political aspirations of Hauraki are first briefly discussed in the context of the formation of the Thames Native Committee (pp. 22–24). Hauraki views—their goals and their grievances—were often presented in concrete terms. Petition, discussion, and action concerned apparently mundane matters such as the routes taken by roads, the application of rates to land, or the particular decisions of the Native Land Court, but this report suggests that more profound political questions of the place of Maori in the new, colonial society underlay that expression. At issue here was the extent to which their views, objects, and practise would be taken into account in the formulation and application of policy: and their lack of representation (except for the four Maori Members of the House) in both central and local government, on the borough and county councils and the highway boards which were having an increasing influence on the direction and pace of development in the Hauraki district.

The Thames Native Committee

In 1883 Bryce as Native Minister gave a limited response to the ongoing Maori desire for a greater measure of self-government and efforts to gain official recognition of the informal runanga structures which had continued to gather in order to discuss matters of title, and law and order—a practice which was exemplified in the case of Hauraki, by the Pukehange committee discussed in Part 1 of this report, The Crown, the Treaty, and the Hauraki Tribes, 1800–1885. A Thames Native Committee was established under the Native Committee Empowering Act 1883 and was to play a leading role in the negotiations at Piako, (discussed at pp. 43–53). Its major concerns, expressed at the meetings with Ballance in 1885, were the costs of the land court, the lack of Maori authority over the title process, and lack of consultation in the formulation of legislation. The effectiveness of the Committee was, however, diminished by administrative lines which took little account of traditional tribal affiliations, and the unwillingness of the Government to accord it any real power. Ultimately, as the negotiations at Piako demonstrated, the Native Committee had the power neither to impose its decisions on its own people, nor to influence the policy of the Government. The Government used the Committee as a vehicle for negotiation but

5

THE CROWN, THE TREATY, AND THE HAURAKI TRIBES, 1880–1980

paid little attention to either its criticisms of the Native Land Court, or, to the reluctance to open Piako to the court's jurisdiction and the competing survey of boundaries.

Crown purchasing, 1880–1890

Crown purchasing activity slowed in the 1880s largely because of lack of funds and retrenchment (see pp. 27–54). The first goal of a reduced Native Department and its field officers was to bring outstanding negotiations at Ohinemuri and Piako to completion and offers of sale of new areas were treated with far more caution than had been the case in the 1870s. The first part of this report showed how the Government succeeded in bringing over 66,000 acres of the freehold at Ohinemuri through the court and all but 10% of that area transferred completely into its hands in 1882. The Government was, however, dissatisfied with that result, and in effect, considered the purchase to be incomplete. Ohinemuri lands continued to slowly transfer out of Maori hands. The reserves for the original vendors were left alone for the meantime, but the Ohinemuri A blocks awarded to non-vendors remained a target for Crown purchase activity throughout the 1880s. By 1887 another 5,826 acres had been acquired by the Crown with no further provision of reserves, leaving Maori with only a little over 20,000 acres out of the whole original Ohinemuri gold field area. The pace of loss gathered in the 1890s when, as the second chapter shows, Government policy emphasised the importance of opening land for close settlement. Almost all the remaining Ohinemuri lands were acquired by the Crown over the next ten years as, on the one hand, Maori had been left in debt by the lengthy Native Land Court hearings for the block, and on the other, the Government became more willing to acquire reserves despite a rhetoric of leaving Maori with a self-sufficiency in land.

Although the Native Land Purchase Department was more chary of offers, or claims of mineral wealth, it was generally willing to initiate the purchase of blocks of proven value to ensure absolute government control of sub-surface resources and European control of related development, responding positively to the requests of local politicians, local bodies, and Pakeha residents for active pursuit of acquisition. Often, however, the transfer of lands resulting from such initiatives was piecemeal, and negotiations to finalise transactions or to acquire further lands out of parent blocks extended into the 1890s. This process was exemplified throughout the last two decades of the nineteenth century by the case of Te Aroha hot springs and township where Maori interests were gradually sacrificed to the perceived requirements of development (see pp. 31–34).

At first, Government officials and ministers were conscious that Maori in the Te Aroha district had little land left and generally refused to countenance the lifting of prohibition against further sale of the reserves there. From very early on, however, exceptions were made to that policy as restrictions against sale were lifted to allow the gifts of sites for churches and public buildings, and as the Government sought to acquire lands surrounding the hot springs domain which had already been 'gifted' by Maori right-holders at the time of negotiations for the parent block. Despite the contributions which they had already made to the development of the colonial economy and local infrastructure, it was still expected that Maori should only receive a small price for any land

6

Introduction: Chapter Summary

which the Government was acquiring to 'improve' and 'enhance the prosperity' of the district. On the one hand, Maori were seen as benefiting from that development, but on the other, their continuing presence as landowners was blamed for inhibiting it. Thus, their holdings remained a suitable target for purchase despite temporary retrenchment in policy or brief periods of regard for the welfare of Maori in the district.

Four case studies are drawn from Alexander's work to demonstrate continuing Government interest in acquiring the freehold of Hauraki lands containing minerals, partly to secure the absolute control of sub-surface resources, and partly in order to relieve itself of the need to pay out revenues to Maori. Even at a time of retrenchment, efforts to purchase gold field blocks might be stimulated by occasional discoveries of minerals deposits (as in the case of Te Ipu o Moehau), by the demands of the local settler community and capital investment, and by the general belief that such lands should not pass into private hands—this was expressed in the standing authority to land purchase officers to 'purchase if opportunity offered'. The practise of negotiation was complicated by the role of the gold field warden who operated also as a purchase officer in the district. By this stage, little remained of the original paternalistic colouration to the functions of the warden. The activities of this officer were particularly questionable in the case of Kuaotunu where he began arranging mining tenure and laying out a mining township before gaining the consent of Maori owners, and at Moehau no. 4 where he advised the Government to withdraw from the terms of the original rental agreement set up in 1862, since this arrangement was no longer profitable. He subsequently treated the block as if it remained in the gold field, failing to make a new agreement with the owners. In following negotiations for the freehold, the Government's attention was devoted largely to protecting the interests of the major company still working the gold field on the block. A questionable level of pressure was subsequently applied on Maori to induce them to sell the freehold of Moehau, the payment of overdue revenues being made contingent upon that agreement (se pp. 34–42).

The final section of discussion of Crown policy in the 1880s concerns the negotiations for lands in the vicinity of the Piako River, the roots of which lay in the 1860s with the confiscation of Hauraki lands at Pukorokoro-Te Hoe-o-Tainui-Hapuakohe, and Mackay's raihana payments in the 1870s (discussed in Volume 4 at pp. 129–134, 204–208). The Government was particularly anxious to see a return for its expenditure in the area, but there were serious defects in the transaction on which its claim was based. In particular, payments had largely gone to only one of the several iwi holding rights in that region, amounts had been carelessly distributed, and so much time had lapsed since these had been made that the recipient hapu had a flawed knowledge of the circumstances and implications of the earlier acceptance of those monies.

In the early 1880s the Government first concentrated on reaching an agreement with Ngati Maru who had received no payments in the preceding decade but whose lands remained tied up because they had been proclaimed as under negotiation for purchase. These efforts to have Ngati Maru bring their claims through the Native Land Court failed initially, partly because of the tribal complexities—in particular, that created by the continuing presence on the ground of peoples whom Marutuahu claimed to have

7

THE CROWN, THE TREATY, AND THE HAURAKI TRIBES, 1880–1980

`conquered', which description they hotly disputed. There was, however, also a level of reluctance among Ngati Maru to the land being surveyed and brought through the land court which surprised government officers. Part of that hostility derived from the longterm kingite opposition of some members of Ngati Maru who were based in the area, but objections also came from the 'friendly' sections of the tribe who did not think that they should have to bear the costs of a survey being undertaken largely for the benefit of the Crown. The Government countered by bullying leaders, and with the use of force of law when physical obstruction took place.

Chapter Crown Policy and Maori Aspiration, 1890–1914

The second chapter deals with Crown purchase policy in the Hauraki region in the period 1890–1914, delineating the escalation of loss of land for Maori, most particularly in the floodplain of the Waihou and Piako Rivers where the Government's success in bringing the first Ngati Paoa blocks through the court opened the last Hauraki territory under native title to that institution. It is intrinsic to the argument in this and following chapters, that there was plenty of evidence available to the Liberal dominated administrations of these years, both that the Hauraki people were in danger of becoming landless under the current policies, and that the operation of the native land laws and court were in large part to blame. Apart from the intermittent remarks of officers in the field and ongoing protests from Hauraki Maori, particularly in the form of Kotahitanga (discussed at pp. 74–76), benchmarks of criticism were provided by the Native Land Laws Commission in 1891, and the Stout Ngata Commission of 1906–1907 (at pp. 55–58 & 85–90, respectively). Despite a rhetoric of 'response' to Maori wishes and of ensuring that they were left with a 'self-sufficiency', the primary object of Government was to open native land to European settlement. There were frequent overhauls of the legislation and tinkering with the administration and rules pertaining to alienation and purchase, but the policy was unchanging: vigorous Crown deployment of pre-emptive powers and pursuit of land acquisition on the one hand; and on the other, frequent lifting of any restrictions on title which might otherwise interfere with the transfer of native lands into European hands.

The revival of Government interest in the acquisition of Hauraki land was signalled at a practical level by the despatch of Gilbert Mair to the district as a purchase officer in 1894; and more generally, by the trend of statutory enactment in these years. Legislation was designed to 'facilitate alienation'. In 1888 the Native Land Act had swept away the innovations attempted by Bryce and Ballance, reintroducing direct purchase of native land, but the Crown's pre-emptive power was re-established under the Native Land Purchase and Acquisition Act 1893 and Native Land Court Act 1894. The very success of the Crown's purchase operations over the next five years, meant that the Liberal Government was willing to respond to Kotahitanga grievances and allow Maori a small degree of control over the alienation process under the Maori Council Act and the Maori Land Administration Act 1900. But in 1905 the passage of the Maori Land Settlement Act signalled a change of policy back to active purchase in order to satisfy continuing

8

Introduction: Chapter Summary

demands for 'idle Maori land' to be made available for settlement. Mackay, who had been specially hired under the legislation, was able to buy another 16,175 acres in the Hauraki district over the next two years. In 1909 the land legislation was overhauled once again. Direct purchase of Maori lands was opened more fully to private individuals but the power of the Government to prohibit such dealings, by Order in Council, while it negotiated with Maori was retained. Although the last phase of acquisition (under public works legislation) was now largely complete, the Government continued to utilise powers under section 363 of the Native Land Act 1909, to claim a monopoly of negotiation while making occasional purchases in the district, for purposes ranging from the acquisition of lands for soldiers' settlements, improvement of access, and sites for hospitals and schools.

The Crown's interest throughout this period was focused on the Hauraki Plains as the only extensive lands in Maori hands with potential to be turned into dairy farms, but the more active policy of acquisition and the deployment of officers to the district was almost certain to draw the remaining peninsula lands into the compass of purchase operations. Mair, Mackay, and other Government officers were thus able to acquire at least another 62,000 acres in the peninsula lands from 1890 to 1912. Of particular note was the Crown's willingness to buy reserves now that there was little else available (discussed at Chapter Three) and, at the prompting of the local politicians, business community, and mining interest, to purchase the best of what remained to Maori. The discussion here draws on the example of the Kuaotunu blocks where gold had been recently discovered and of township properties where Maori ownership was blamed for holding back development.

The impact of court and survey costs in the Hauraki Plains

This was a time of some economic distress for the Hauraki iwi. The expenses of defining title by means of the hearing process before the Native Land Court and the survey of boundaries had a particularly profound impact on their ability to hold onto remaining lands—more especially in the Hauraki Plains. The Government had long know that this area was particularly fraught with difficulties of title determination, being characterised by clashing colours of right: the one derived from conquest and consistent use; the other based on an argument of the pre-eminence of unbroken physical occupation. That evidence of dispute over right-holding was to be found both in the early reports of officers, and in the troublesome nature of the negotiations in the 1880s, which had been frequently interrupted by protests and resistance to survey. Nonetheless, the Crown pushed ahead, determined to have title defined in the last Hauraki territory under native tenure and the area opened to purchase and settlement.

Once the first obstacle had been cleared in the Hauraki Plains district—the definition of boundaries of Ngati Paoa blocks subject to the old raihana debts, and passage of those lands through the court—the dam was broken. Other iwi with rights in the district began to bring their lands through the court, signalling the breakdown of final opposition to the land court amongst the Hauraki people as the Kotahitanga ban collapsed, and as those groups who had formerly refused to accept its jurisdiction now gave way. Bitter rivalries were expressed in the ensuing cases, as Marutuahu, Ngati Haua, and the Ngati Hako

9

THE CROWN, THE TREATY, AND THE HAURAKI TRIBES, 1880–1980

peoples brought their claims to court and argued their different interpretations of history, right, and evidence of occupation in the region. Hearings were lengthy and expensive, the same issues being resubmitted for court decision repeatedly and, in most blocks, eventually brought to the appellate court. Adding to the expense of the court hearings were the costs of surveyors, condemned by the Government's own officer in the district, as 'rapacious Pakehas'. Most notable was the debt of almost £3,000 owed by Ngati Paoa based at Te Hoe-o-Tainui for the survey of their lands. The Government might take over such liens itself, and actively pursued award of land for survey costs, invariably dictating how much land would be required to cancel the debt, by setting the rate of conversion of the money amount into acres.

The final result, even for the winners of the land court struggle, was one of debt and the need to sell more and more of the blocks concerned. The Crown's acquisition of lands as a result of the pressing need of grantees to pay off pressing court and survey debts is detailed on pp. 63–74. The Government often drove a hard bargain. Maori were paid the lowest amount it was thought that they would accept, so that, after all the expenses were paid, they received very little benefit from establishing title. Mair calculated, for example, that Ngati Hako had paid 12/- per acre in court fees, agents and survey costs, but the Government rarely offered more than 5/- per acre in purchase price.

Maori Land Settlement Act 1905

The passage of the Maori Land Settlement Act 1905 (discussed at pp. 77–83) signalled a further surge of Crown purchase activity resulting in the acquisition of some 11,000 acres in the Hauraki Plains district alone over the next two years. Particularly questionable was the utilisation of section 20 of the Act in the case of II blocks (amounting to over 5,000 acres) to bypass problems caused by the refusal of minority owners to sell to the Crown in its pursuit of a programme of purchase of delta lands for draining and conversion to dairy farms. Under this section, the whole of a block could be designated as Crown land if the majority in value had been acquired, when there were more than ten owners, and the amount owing in respect of the shares of the non-signatories to the deed of transfer held by the Receiver General on their behalf. Not only did this mean that minority non-sellers had no say in the price to be received for their interests, but their capacity as duly recognised owners to refuse to sell their lands for whatever reason, was completely nullified.

The Crown continued, also, to make compulsory acquisitions of blocks in the floodplain for 'drainage purposes' under the Hauraki Plains Act and the Public Works Act of 1908. The major utilisation of the Act took place between 1908 and 1911, during which time nearly 2,000 acres were acquired compulsorily in nine different blocks, with compensation set at levels which ensured that it was the Crown not the former Maori owners who gained the economic benefits from the land improvement schemes for which those blocks had been required. These acquisitions for public works purposes are discussed more fully in Chapter IV.

This marked the final phase of intensive Government engagement in the district. But in spite of earlier advice to the contrary, and the evidence before their own eyes, Government

I0

Introduction: Chapter Summary

officials under the Massey, National and Coates administrations (1912–1928) persisted in the belief that Maori land should be available for purchase as required. The priorities of the Public Works Department, of local government bodies, and of the Pakeha populace still tended to take precedence over consideration of Maori needs in the application of policy. The Crown continued to have occasional recourse to public works powers in the Hauraki Plains district, but a variety of objects lay behind the label of 'facilitation of drainage' for which blocks were supposedly acquired in these years: tidy boundaries, better road access, compensation of Pakeha farmers for takings on their land, convenient sites for department workshops. Those goals might take priority even if these areas comprised some of the last papakainga lands held by the owners in question. In other general acquisitions, the Crown was once again greatly assisted by its ability to prohibit private dealing (under section 363, Native Land Act 1909), and thus, to control the conditions of negotiation while its officers purchased individual interests over a protracted period if the majority of the owners called together at a block meeting had refused to sell at the Government's price.

Chapter HI: Reserves and Removal of Restrictions on Alienation, 1880–1909

Much of the impact of enactment of land law was experienced in the context of reserved lands. If, on the one hand, the trend of Government was to speed up the availability of land to the small settler, partly by means of enacting special purchase powers for the Crown, the other was towards easing restrictions which had been placed on the title of reserved lands. Government legislation with regard to reserves, and the impact of policy on Hauraki 'inalienable' land holdings from 1880–1910 is discussed in this chapter.

The putting aside of reserved lands in Hauraki is briefly discussed. The concept of reserves was developed in an ad hoc way. When officials spoke of 'reserves' they might be referring to one of three different situations. Often, lands which had been held back from a larger sale were seen by officials as having been 'reserved', even though the disposal remained entirely in the hands of Maori. Although such lands had no protection, they were often considered to provide adequately for Maori requirements—and to prove that purchase operations could continue unabated in the district. Sometimes, Maori and Government negotiators arranged for 'reserves' to be created out of a Crown purchase of a block. The whole of the block transferred to the Crown which might hold a portion of that land (generally 10%) in trust for the vendors. These lands were eventually brought under the management of the Public Trustee. Few areas, however, were vested in the Crown in trust for Maori in the Hauraki district. More frequently, 'reserves' were granted back to the owners but with restrictions against alienation placed on the title by the Native Land Court. The Court might also place a restriction on the alienation of a block at the time of award at the request of the grantees even though no sale was involved.

One side of the coin of Government policy was the setting aside of 'reserved lands'; the other was the withdrawal of protections from those blocks to enable their alienation. The

THE CROWN, THE TREATY, AND THE HAURAKI TRIBES, 1880–1980

Government's role was three-fold. It made the laws which governed the protections on reserved lands, administered the applications for the removal of restrictions against alienation from the title, and frequently, was itself the purchaser. The trend of legislation was towards making it easier to have restrictions removed so that an alienation could take place, most especially, if the purchaser was the Government. Three particular issues were involved: the streamlining of procedures for the lifting of restrictions, the diminishing requirements for owner consent, and the growing ease with which the Crown could buy such land. Eventually, the entire structure of restricted title was dismantled.

The legislative onslaught on the reserved lands was initiated by the Atkinson Government with the passage in 1888 of the Native Land Administration Act and the Native Land Court Act. This legislation signalled a new phase of 'free trade' in Maori land, enabled the Native Land Court to remove restrictions, and reduced requirements for unanimous consent among the owners. That year, also, the Crown by means of the Native Contracts and Promises Act specifically divested itself of its trust for the Waikawau reserves so that they could be sold. The Native Land Laws Amendment Act 1890 chipped away at requirements for owner consent, as did the Native Land Purchase and Acquisition Act 1893 which, with the Native Land Purchase Act of the preceding year, also provided for easier removal of restrictions when the Crown was the purchaser. The Native Land Act 1894, passed as a consolidating measure by the Liberal Government, reduced the level of owner consent even further to one-third only, provided that the Governor gave consent in the case of restrictions which had been placed on the title prior to 1888.

These legislative moves were followed by an upswing in the removal of restrictions on the title of Hauraki land. As legislation began loosening restrictions, the official consciousness of the need to ensure that Maori in Hauraki held onto remaining lands also fell away. In the early 1880s, after the finalisation of the extensive purchases undertaken in the 1870s, administrations were particularly aware of the rapid decline in the holdings in many parts of the region. Restrictions on lease might be lifted but both Bryce and Ballance, as successive Native Ministers, generally vetoed further transfer of the freehold of Hauraki lands out of Maori hands. This was particularly the case at Te Aroha. Even so, they were prepared to reverse that policy if the 'public good' was deemed to be concerned. Thus, Bryce endorsed the lifting of restrictions on town lots at Paeroa to enable gifts to the Church and to the Crown for public buildings, while legislation was passed to also authorise the alienation of Te Aroha township sites for a school, 'public uses' and 'public streets'. This was followed by lifting of restrictions to allow the Government to purchase the land surrounding the mineral springs area, at a cheap rate, for an endowment to the Domain Board.

While the Native Department, and thereafter, the Justice Department retained responsibility for cases involving reserves created prior to 1888, decisions about the removal of restrictions on title moved into the jurisdiction of the Native Land Court. Both the capacity and the willingness of the Native Minister and his Department to veto transactions, as Ballance and Bryce had done, declined accordingly. Most attention was paid to whether the proportion of owners required under legislation had been met and whether the price was fair, not whether Maori should hold onto those lands. The

12

Introduction: Chapter Summary

question of whether applicants had sufficient land left was assessed by the Native Land Court. But the minutes of the court, in these years, suggest that proper enquiry whether applicants had sufficient lands left was practically non-existent. In general, the statement of the applicant was accepted, and recorded instances of checks on those claims, or rejections of applications, are rare. The impact of this combination of easing legislative requirements, and a declining exercise of Government responsibility is delineated in case studies of the rapid dissipation of lands reserved from the sale of parent blocks at Te Aroha, Ohinemuri, Waikawau, and Moehau.

Chapter IV: Impact of Public Works and Development in the Early Twentieth Century

The fourth chapter discusses the environmental impact of the Government's purchase, development and public works policies for the Hauraki people in the early twentieth century. The first part of this discussion focuses on the deepening effects of mining on the lives of the Hauraki people, even though most of them had long ceased to receive any direct benefit from the opening of their lands to the Government's jurisdiction. The ability of Maori to rely on rivers for drinking water, whitebait, and eels, the value of their cultivations, and the integrity of wahi tapu in riparian blocks were severely affected by the discharge of mining debris, tailings, and cyanide into watercourses under permissive Government legislation. The evidence is limited, but suggests that Government officials tended to give priority to the more apparent interests of economic development in assessing whether waterways should be exploited for dumping, and to the claims of Europeans in assessing damage, even though their reliance on natural water sources was lesser in degree than that of Maori.

Drainage of the Hauraki Plains

The theme of Maori resource and land loss as a result of the Government's development goals and public works schemes is explored in more depth with reference to the draining of the Hauraki Plains. A number of factors came together at the turn of the century to threaten Maori control and retention of this area which was valued for its bird and fish resource rather than for the quality of the cultivable soil. Included here were the development of the dairy export industry which gave kahikatea a new value for butter boxes, and a boom in the flax industry also demanding wood as fuel for the stampers, enhanced technological capabilities which permitted large-scale drainage works, and the Government's increasing responsiveness to demands for land for conversion into dairy farms. Crown purchase for the draining of the delta lands was facilitated by the Maori Land Settlement Act 1905 (discussed previously at pp. 77–83) and by public works legislation—both the general enactment of 1908 and the Hauraki Plains Act also passed that year. Some 1922 acres had been acquired under the legislation by 1911, and another 1,212 acres by 1925. In setting compensation levels the Government applied rules which ensured that it retained the benefits from drainage work for itself. Under the betterment principle which operated until 1920, any additional value resulting from public works was not taken into account in assessing compensation.

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THE CROWN, THE TREATY, AND THE HAURAKI TRIBES, 1880–1980

Adding to the perception of the people based in the area that they had been denied the fruits of the growth in agricultural wealth was an oftimes ruthless attitude amongst officials in the Public Works Department, and in wider Government, to the lands that had remained to Maori after the initial round of purchases under the Maori Lands Settlement Act 1905 and compulsory acquisition under the Public Works Act 1908. The Government continued to apply public works legislation in the district as it saw fit. Although takings were purportedly for drainage purposes, the ends to that goal continued to be widely interpreted and might include the acquisition of Maori land to give in compensation to a Pakeha farmer whose land had been taken, to comply with the plans of settlement schemes, for departmental workshops, or because the presence of a `native owned' section was seen as 'detrimental' to the prosperity of the area. Warnings that the Maori concerned had little other land left held little weight with officials in the Public Works Department and the Department of Lands and Survey who invariably answered that the lands were absolutely required for development projects.

Chapter v: Hauraki Land and Rates, 1870–1970

The fifth chapter discusses the issue of rates. It is argued here that problems surrounding the rating of Maori land should be viewed in the light of the wider questions of place of Maori in New Zealand society and their lack of representation in local government. The genesis of a developing divergence in attitude to the contribution and responsibilities of Maori landowners is described. On the one hand Maori had no voice in the local bodies which levied rates and dictated the construction of local works and roads, but on the other were increasingly expected, in the last quarter of the century, to 'bear their share' of the financial burden of developing the infrastructure. Maori, for their part, could not see why their lands should be suddenly subject to taxes, while in their view, inadequate recognition had been given to their contribution in terms of the cheap price of their land and of gifts of sites for roads, schools and other public purposes. As title fragmented, and the Government interposed itself in the management of lands, Maori argued that they should not be liable to rates until the 'handicaps' had been removed and their full powers of control restored.

Rating laws and Maori land

At Thames, Ngati Maru reacted to public works projects and the possibility of being taxed by negotiating with the County Council directly, arranging by written deed that they would allow the county road to Paeroa to go through as far as Hikutaia but that: `The Natives are not now or at any time to pay rates or the generations succeeding them.' They reserved, too, the right to withdraw their consent to right of way if that agreement should be broken. In their eyes, that agreement embodied a principle of partnership which continued to hold authority well into the twentieth century, but the Government accorded it a much lesser value. At first it honoured the exception largely by default of general administration rather than in acknowledgement of the right of Maori to strike such a bargain: thereafter, only at the absolute insistence of the Hauraki iwi.

14

Introduction: Chapter Summary

The issue resurfaced in the twentieth century as the Government again sought to strengthen the application of rating laws to Maori land. In the first quarter of the century, a series of Acts gradually brought Maori owned land on the same footing as that owned by Pakeha, and strengthened local body powers of recovery. The Hauraki people protested strongly when the Thames County Council took out charging orders against 65 blocks in the district in 1925. The Native Land Court rejected their argument that the Hauraki lands were exempt from rates under the 1877 compact, finding that this agreement had 'no legal force or effect'. Their protests continued, however, and in 1930 the Government reluctantly issued an Order in Council excepting 31 blocks from the Rating Act 1925. Neither local government nor Maori were satisfied. Maori saw the exemption of only those blocks adjoining the main county road as a narrow interpretation of the earlier accord which they thought pertained to the whole district while the Thames County Council resented the loss to their revenue. In 1962, despite the representations of Maori that the original agreement had been intended to provide a 'pattern of relationships for the future', the Government decided to terminate the Thames exemption, phasing it out over a five year period.

Rate arrears

Elsewhere in the Hauraki district, growing arrears in rates posed yet another threat to the capacity of Maori to hold onto their remaining properties. The Maori holdings at Thames, in particular, were squeezed between high valuations, low commercial returns, and problems in raising capital for improvements. In one case, as much as £3000 was owed, yet the properties concerned were known to be capable of producing very little rent at that time.

During the depression of the 1930s, the failure of Maori landowners to pay rates was blamed for much of the financial difficulty being experienced by the Thames Borough Council. The Borough Council, and after 1932 the Special Commissioner who had been appointed under legislation (the Thames Borough Commissioner Act) to take over its financial administration, actively pursued recovery from Maori. The Native Minister, whose consent was required for sale of land by means of a vesting order if owners were in default, was also more willing to contemplate such a step in the case of land at Thames than was generally the case, partly because the retention of such areas did not fit in with the standard model of the Maori landowner as a small farmer working papakainga holdings. As a consequence between 1934 and 1936 several blocks of town land, whose retention might have enabled local Maori to participate in the future commercial development of the town, were allowed instead, to transfer to local government at cheap depression prices properties valued at over £7,600, being vested in the Thames Borough Council in settlement of rates arrears of £3,400.

Chapter VI   Hauraki Iwi and the Gold Fields, 1890–1980

The sixth chapter discusses issues relating to mineral rights and revenues in the period covered by this report. Four major areas of concern are emphasised: the continuing

THE CROWN, THE TREATY, AND THE HAURAKI TRIBES, 1880–1980

problems in the Government's administration of the original cession agreements as a result of bureaucratic incompetencies, the fragmentation of title to the land, and the introduction of new mining laws which effected the revenues generated by gold field blocks; the impact of that legislation on the ability of Hauraki Maori to withhold lands containing valuable sub-surface resources from the Government's jurisdiction; the inability of Maori to withdraw their lands from that jurisdiction even though mining had long ceased on them; and the unsuccessful struggle of Maori to gain redress for the Crown's earlier actions in opening the gold field, the subsequent failure to properly care for their interests in its management, and ultimately, in acquiring the complete freehold.

Administration of gold field reserves

It had been intrinsic to Maori agreement in handing over the administration of mining to the Government, that the revenues which they had been promised would be properly collected and distributed; but problems continued to plague the management of gold field revenues well into the 1930s. Those problems derived from two sets of circumstances: legislative changes which directly effected revenues generated on Maori owned blocks, and ongoing inefficiencies in the machinery of collection and distribution.

Evidence of problems in the actual administration of the revenues—of charges on Maori, long-term delays in payment, and the almost complete breakdown of mechanisms of distribution by 19000—has been outlined in this chapter. It is to be noted that by the 1920s over £2000 was outstanding in revenues which were 'unclaimed' because the mechanisms of payment had completely broken down. These monies were eventually applied to the general purposes of Ngati Maru and associated tribes, under section 17 of the Native Purposes Act 1935.

Of particular significance in terms of legislative impact was the passage of the Mining Act 1886 which altered requirements for miners' rights by increasing the area that could be held under them, and thus, also the revenues to be paid to the Maori owners. These changes were instituted over Maori protest, and Wilkinson, the Government officer of the time, who combined responsibilities for the native gold field revenue account and for land purchase, also gave strong support to the validity of their complaint. He pointed out the cession agreements had conveyed the impression that the Crown had been 'desirous at that time that the Natives should benefit as much as possible through having thrown open their lands for gold mining'. Yet the terms of those agreements had been altered to Maori disadvantage without their consent. In his view, their revenues had been reduced by as much as 75%, and the Government in taking this step had 'apparently overlooked, or ignored the fact that such action, though beneficial enough to the gold digger, was disastrous to the Natives ... and ... in a measure broke faith with them.' The effectiveness of legislative changes intended to redress part of the problem was undermined by limited application, on the specific direction of the Minister of Mines.

Hauraki Maori petitioned the Government over the matter, and in 1894, the Goldfields and Mines Committee acknowledged that they had sustained a loss through the Government's breach of the original agreement. The Committee recommended that the

16

Introduction: Chapter Summary

Government take steps to ascertain the extent of the loss and to recoup the petitioners. The Government continued to stall on the matter and eventually solved the problem to its own satisfaction by purchasing the freehold of the lands in most contention.

In the 1880s the Crown began to withdraw from its previous mining arrangements, but was unwilling to meet Maori demands that complete authority over gold field blocks—especially where mining had all but ceased—should be returned to them. Instead the Crown acted as though its jurisdiction continued even though Maori owners had not consented to any new arrangements. At the same time, Government passed a series of statutes strengthening its prerogative over and power to control precious sub-surface resources, thus distancing Maori further from control of both minerals and the land in which they lay. The Reserves and Endowments in Mining Districts Act 1882 extended the operation of mining legislation to all public reserves and endowments. While 'reserves for the use, support, or education' of Maori were excluded, the Governor-in-Council was empowered to bring any such land under the Act's jurisdiction. Under the Mining Act (no. 2) 1887 the Governor was given the power to 'alter and vary' the terms of the contract and conditions under which Maori had ceded their lands for mining. The Mining Act 1891 enabled the Governor to bring any Native Reserve (except for those specifically reserved from mining cessions) into its ambit. In 1892 the Native Land Court was empowered to declare lands open to mining on application of the Governor if the majority of owners consented. The distinction between the ordinary reserve and the mining reserve was swept away by the Mining Act Amendment Act 1896 which declared any lands for residences, cultivations, or burial sites that had been reserved from the cession of the gold field to be now available for mining purposes 'in like manner in all respects as if they had been ceded.' That trend towards making Maori-owned land available to mining whatever the wishes of the owners continued into the twentieth century. Of particular note here was the Mining Act 1910 which dropped the requirement for majority consent before the Native Land Court could bring Maori land within the compass of the Government's mining jurisdiction.

Maori protest

Maori protested the trend of this legislation towards the diminution of both their rights to withhold lands from the Crown's jurisdiction and of their revenues by the introduction of laws without any consultation on the issue, or notice of that intention. In the debates on the Mining Act Amendment Act 1892, for example, Taipua roundly criticised the Government's disregard of Maori interest, arguing that the rights of the minority owners were being ignored, and remnants of control over their gold field lands utterly destroyed: `What the Natives complained of was this: that each succeeding Parliament endeavoured to make the laws worse than those passed by the previous Parliament.' Hauraki Maori petitioned repeatedly about the reduction of their revenues as a result of changes in the mining legislation while Heke, in the debates on the Mining Act Amendment Act 1896, challenged the Crown's strengthening assertion of its right to precious sub-surface resources. He denied that Maori had given up 'their properties and to the gold and silver and other minerals' when they had handed over sovereignty to the Crown in 1840. Rather,

17

THE CROWN, THE TREATY, AND THE HAURAKI TRIBES, 1880–1980

in his view, 'the fact of the Natives signing on the one hand and the Queen on the other hand agreeing upon a treaty ... show[ed] completely that the land, property and every other property contained thereon ... belonged to the Natives.'

There were two mining-related issues of particular importance for the Hauraki people in the twentieth century. One relates to their efforts to regain complete control over the gold field lands, played out in the context of blocks still occupied under resident site licences which had been issued by the gold field warden; the other to their struggle to gain redress for the Crown's past actions with regard to mineral rights, the cession agreements, and the acquisition of the gold field blocks.

The MacCormick Commission

In the 1930s Hauraki iwi recommenced petitioning the Government about the past conduct of the Crown with reference to mineral rights, the payment of revenues, and acquisition of the gold field blocks. The petitions which expressed a deep but largely undefined sense of loss were referred to the Native Land Court for inquiry and report under section 22 of the Native Purposes Act 1935. The resulting inquiry became known as the MacCormick Commission.

From the beginning the Hauraki petitioners were hampered in presenting their case. The Crown's officers largely dictated the terms of the inquiry, and the Crown's ownership of minerals and right to legislate as it saw fit was assumed as given. There was no examination of the implications of the Treaty of Waitangi or the question of a native right to sub-surface resources. The difficulties and costs of properly researching and presenting a case were acknowledged to be prohibitive, and the Crown denied the petitioners access to the Government record on the grounds that this would 'enable them to frame ... more direct allegations', might result in misinterpretation, give rise to 'a lot of allegations that might be fanciful but very difficult to answer' and 'seriously embarrass' the Government. Thus, the MacCormick Commission—and indeed, all later enquiries into the question—looked at the case from one viewpoint only, with evidence provided exclusively by Government officers, and 'the rules of the game' also set by the Crown.

The major direction of the petitioners' case developed along lines which fitted in with the requirements of the law, and with the sources of information available to them: that the deeds of cession had guaranteed the gold field revenues to the signatories and their heirs for all time, which intention had been recognised by subsequent statutes; and that the deeds had created a fiduciary obligation on the part of the Crown which it had failed to fulfil. That failure lay not only in the poor administration of gold field revenues but also in the Crown breach of the principle that a trustee was not entitled to purchase any of the property in trust for his own benefit. Crown counsel countered with evidence showing that no fraud had been committed. Even though there might have been delays and endemic problems, the extant accounts showed that revenues had been paid out, that lands had been purchased not taken, and that the cession deeds created no trust, merely a `bargain for a right or easement'.

Introduction: Chapter Summary

The Court accepted the Crown's evidence that, while there had been serious lapses in bookkeeping, no actual fraud had taken place, and reluctantly rejected the petitioners' argument that a trust had been created by the cession deeds. In the Court's view, the Crown had become a fiduciary agent responsible to Maori for 'its actions in regard to mining rights and the revenues collected, but not further or otherwise.' The petitioners could not show that the Crown had intended for them to receive those revenues after the freehold of the land had been sold, nor that a trust had been created in the land itself. MacCormick did indicate some unease, however, about both the state of the gold field revenue accounts, and the nature of the gold field purchases. The Crown was unable to render a completely satisfactory account of the revenues received and expended by it. Thus, if the petitioners had been unable to prove that any wrong-doing had taken place in the administration of the revenues, the Crown had been unable to show, definitively, that they had no grievance. MacCormick was also critical of earlier Crown agents for leading Maori into 'very bad bargains' when they sold the land. He thought the offence was mitigated by the general practice of the period, and the fact that the real profits from mining came after later technological developments. Nonetheless, in his opinion, these transactions would not have been approved had they been subject to judicial review.

Although actual illegal deed had not been proved, MacCormick recommended that the Crown make an ex-gratia payment of between £30,000 and £40,000, in view of 'the large sums received by the Crown by reason of its purchases of the freehold of land previously ceded to it for mining purposes', questions whether Maori had 'fully appreciated the effect of their sales, and the further doubt as to the proper distribution to the Natives of the moneys they were entitled to'.

For the next 50 years, the Hauraki people petitioned repeatedly for the Crown to implement that recommendation, being thwarted by the turnabout of ministries, narrow official construction of responsibility, and Government reluctance to admit liability for nineteenth century transactions. As the question was brought to the attention of; and reexamined by successive administrations, two divergent attitudes emerged. The dominant view within Government was that the claim was stale and unfounded: that the Crown had made payment in good faith when the rights to minerals and to lands had been first acquired and that the 'Court which considered the claim had not found any grounds ... which would provide a reasonable basis for a special payment at this distance of time.' Treasury officials were particularly hostile to the idea of making such a compensatory payment, arguing that to thus address questions of fairness of transaction and understanding of bargain would set a dangerous precedent, likely to reopen the majority of sales in New Zealand. This view was echoed by others such as Ivor Prichard who was directed to look into the question by the Holyoake administration.

A significant dissenting view was voiced, however, generally within the Labour administrations which, over the years, made promises to Hauraki leaders which went unfulfilled before defeat at the elections. Of particular note was Peter Fraser's expressions of endorsement, in 1947–1949, for a proposal from the Hauraki iwi that the sum

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THE CROWN, THE TREATY, AND THE HAURAKI TRIBES, 1880–1980

recommended by MacCormick be granted to enable them to raise their general standard of living and to aid them in education, farm development, and the rehabilitation of their returned servicemen. There was intermittent official recognition subsequently that a `moral obligation' had been created by both MacCormick and Fraser, and that it was unsatisfactory for the Crown to rely on a strictly legal defence to deny the claim. There was growing appreciation, too, that the terms of past examination of the issue had been strongly weighted in favour of the Crown. The settlement of the Hauraki claim was not considered a matter of priority, however, and the more sympathetic Governments invariably fell before any steps towards making a compensatory payment had been completed.

Resident site licences

Resident site licences had been set up under nineteenth century mining legislation to provide residential holdings for the mining population (see pp. 172–175). Mining had largely ceased at Thames and Coromandel, but the area remained under the Government's jurisdiction and the warden continued, even in the 1920, to grant licences under the general legislation. By this stage, the licence gave the holder of it the equivalent of a renewable lease to Maori land for trivial rents and for purposes totally unrelated to mining activities. In the late 1960s, 51 licences were identified as still operating on Maori land, generating a total rent of $81 on property with an unimproved value of $20000.

The Government's attention was drawn to the matter on a number of occasions, both by its own advisors and by Hauraki Maori. Prichard during his inquiry into Mac Cormick's recommendations had, for example, privately informed the Minister of Maori Affairs that the owners of the properties held under such licences had a 'definite grievance' which probably would be the 'subject of a meritorious claim' sooner or later. Despite ongoing Maori complaint, and while the trend of policy was towards doing away with differentials in mining law regarding the treatment of Maori and Pakeha lands, there was considerable reluctance to interfere in any way with the interests of third parties. Thus, the Mining Tenures Registration Act 1962 abrogated the Government's power to cancel licences for breach of the conditions of issue, guaranteeing a virtually perpetual tenure. And when the Mining Act 1971 renounced the Crown's rights under the deeds of cession, the resident site licences were preserved. Maori were forced into negotiation, and into court action, to try to prevent the continuing occupation of their lands on this tenure. When their action before the High Court failed, Maori reluctantly accepted the Government's proposal to buy out lessees of sites on which there were no buildings so that the land could be returned. In occupied sites, however, this step was considered impossible, and the Government offered other lands in exchange or to buy out the Maori owners at current unimproved valuation, with compensation for lost income, and the fact that they had been placed in a position in which they had no alternative but to agree to sell.

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Chapter I

GOVERNMENT POLICY
AND MAORI REACTION, 1880–1890

Maori Concerns and Government Reaction

Much of Hauraki concern in the 1870s and 1880s was apparently grounded in concrete issues: the Thames mudflats, the opening of Ohinemuri, the distribution of mining revenues, the construction of the road to Komata, the setting aside of reserves, lack of compensation for the confiscation of lands at Tauranga and Waikato, and disputed transactions and Native Land Court findings. But wider questions of the meaning of rangatiratanga, of Crown responsibilities, and the place of Maori in economic and social development were also involved here. The gap between Hauraki aspiration and Government response grew. Hauraki Maori sought better economic deals—the recognition of rights to a gold-bearing reserve at Tairua, a more efficient administration of gold field revenues, a better price for kauri than the 25/- set by the gold-mining agreements—while Pakeha officials complained that Maori should not be allowed to pick out the eyes of the land, or to monopolise the profits of the gold field. Maori rejection of the land court, obstruction of roads, and protest over the loss of the foreshore at Thames, of eel weirs on the Waihou, or of cultivations along the Kauaeranga River as a result of timber floating were interpreted by Europeans solely in terms of the Native impediment to settlement and progress. The intent of Hauraki leaders was, however, to regain control of the pace of economic and social transformation rather than to stop change altogether. Even Ngati Hako, strong adherents to kingitanga principles, now sought delay for the fuller consideration of their interests, hitherto largely ignored by the Government, rather than advocating no sale of land at all.

These protests reflected the growing fissure which separated the two races. Maori had almost nothing to do with the machinery of local administration, being unrepresented on highway and harbour boards, local bodies, or on the Provincial Council which exercised considerable influence over the development and management of the gold field, rivers, and harbours by means of the powers of the Superintendent. Hauraki Maori looked for greater power within the new institutions transforming and regulating their lives, often pointing out that legislation which materially affected their rights should have been discussed with them before being introduced. They asked for representation on the Provincial Council, for their own scrutiny of the gold-mining revenues, and for more Maori control over the machinery of land transaction.

21

THE CROWN, THE TREATY, AND THE HAURAKI TRIBES, 1880–1980

(a) The search for control: Native Committees and the Native Land Court

While small groups of kingites resisted survey and public works on the ground, others among the Hauraki iwi attempted to control the pace of alienation by legal means, petitioning the Government, meeting with officials, pursuing legal protection or remedy through the common law and warden courts, and seeking the recognition of the authority of their own institutions. The runanga meetings held in response to the shooting of a surveyor at Pukehange (discussed in The Crown, The Treaty and The Hauraki Tribes, 1800–1885) demonstrated that Maori forums of decision-making continued to operate effectively in the Hauraki rohe. In the early 1880s Maori throughout the country revived the effort to obtain authorisation of such structures to adjudicate matters both of title and of law and order.1 In 1883 Bryce (Native Minister, 1879–1881, 1882–1884) responded to these demands, passing the Native Committees Empowering Act which gave regional committees the authority to discuss disputed land claims, advise the Court, and to referee Maori disputants in certain circumstances, provided that both parties had agreed to accept such arbitration.

Ward points out that the structure established by the Government was ill-suited to Maori perspectives. Bryce intended that only six or seven committees be set up for the whole of the North Island. Eventually 12 regional organisations were formed but Maori would have preferred far smaller, local committees at hapu level.2 Nonetheless, Hauraki, with a history of confederation among the tribes sustained by interlocking right-holding patterns, quickly sought to utilise the structure. A committee was convened, it being resolved that Ngati Tamatera and Ngati Paoa should both send in two members. Three members were to be drawn from both Ngati Maru and Ngati Paoa, and one each from Ngati Hako and Ngati Koi.3 Still, the imposition of arbitrary administrative lines based on Government convenience rather than traditional tribal affiliations, resulted in the grouping of people along the west shore of the Firth (Ngati Paoa and Ngati Whanaunga) with Waikato rather than with Hauraki as they had requested.4 Ngati Paoa based at Waiheke similarly expressed their dissatisfaction at being included in the Kaipara district, with people to whom they held little tie.5

Despite these problems, Hauraki Maori responded with initial enthusiasm to an apparent opportunity to regain authority over the land and law, seeking far wider powers than the Government had in fact contemplated. Raika Whakarongotai, who had chaired the committee at Pukehanga, wrote to the Government:

Your letter ... has arrived and I have seen the information you give in it as to the powers Native Committees will possess to investigate titles to land and to adjudicate on offences.

1 A. Ward, A Show of Justice: Racial 'Amalgamation' in Nineteenth Century New Zealand, Auckland, 1974. p. 290.

2 Ibid.

3 Taipari to Wilkinson,' 6 December 1883. NO 84/156 in MA 23/13 A. Doc. 1, pp. 1-3.

4 See 'Wilkinson memo. for Under Secretary Native Department,' 11 February 1884. NO 84/484 in . Doc. 1,

p. 4

5 'S. Percy Smith to Lewis,' 7 January 1884. In ibid.

22

Chapter 1: Government Policy and Maori Reaction, 1880–1890

Now ... that is exactly what we desire—namely that our committees should have lawful authority. ... 6

This went further than the Government intended, Bryce noting that, 'of course they must be confined to the powers conferred by the Act. They possibly think that the powers of the Committees will be more absolute than is really the case.'7 Subsequent efforts to utilise clause 19 of the rules gazetted by Ballance, which stated that Native Committees could charge fees, quickly prompted a circular from his successor (Mitchelson) that they should use the powers of amendment under clause 9 to strike that power out.8 The Native Committee could wield moral authority only. It will be seen, however, that the body did provide a useful vehicle of negotiation, playing a prominent role in discussions with Ballance, and in the negotiations with the Government over the Piako lands.

A continuing focus for Hauraki concern in the period covered by this report was the destructive effect of land legislation as mediated through a court structure which had been based on the English model without recognition of Maori social usages. The Thames Native Committee met with Ballance in 1885 as he toured the area in promotion of his proposed changes in land legislation. The major issues raised by the Committee were the adverse effects of the Native Land Court and lack of consultation with Maori in making laws. Hoani Nahe, as chairman, asked that Bills be circulated among Maori before being brought in—to which Ballance agreed—and advocated not withdrawal from the title system but greater Maori management of it:

They were very pleased to hear that they were to be allowed to manage their lands for themselves. It was his opinion that, if the preliminary investigation of land were gone into by the Native Committee, it would be much easier for the Native Land Court, and thereby the Maoris would be relieved of the expenses they were now put to in attending Court and paying Court fees, &c.9

Nahe believed that only land that was undisputed should be allowed through the court.10

Ballance responded with some sympathy, admitting to the Thames people that there were serious injustices in the way the system had hitherto operated:

I feel myself shocked and disgusted at the enormous expenses attending the passing of some blocks through the Native Land Court, for it is a notorious fact that some of the blocks have been entirely eaten up by the expenses of lawyers and agents, and in various other ways, the Natives deriving no benefit whatever from the sale of theirs, while their lands have been gone forever.11

Ballance's proposed solution represented a genuine attempt to meet Maori concerns about the impact of individualisation of title, but did not fulfill their aspirations to total control of that process. He had formulated two legislative measures, the Native Lands Administration Act and the Native Land Court Act of 1886, by which he hoped to

6 'Whakarongotai to Wilkinson,' 7 November 1883. NO 84/157 in . Doc. 2, pp. 5–6.

7 'Bryce minute,' 3 December 1883. In .

8 'Circular to all Chairmen of Native Committees,' 5 July 1889. NO 89/1274 in .

9 'Notes of Native Meetings', AJHR 1885, G–1, p. 31. Doc. 3, p.8.

10 Ibid., p. 37. Doc. 3, p.14.

11 Ibid., p. 31. Doc. 3, p.8.

23

THE CROWN, THE TREATY, AND THE HAURAKI TRIBES, 1880-1980

address their grievances while still making land available for settlement. Ward argues that this policy grew from principles which Bryce had been developing since 188o: representation of the interests of the small settlers rather than of the rich speculators, and disenchantment with direct private purchase which favoured speculation because of the complexities created by the Native Land Act 1873.12 Ballance, on coming to office, continued in this policy of preventing the 'land monopoly for the few'. The Native Land Court Act consolidated previous legislation, simplifying the division of land, but the more significant measure, at least potentially, was the Native Lands Administration Act 1886. Ballance contemplated a system in which the Crown sold or leased blocks as an agent for Maori, and in which a tribal role in the management and disposition of lands was preserved by the incorporation of owners of a block as one legal entity which would then appoint a 'block committee' with executive powers. Direct purchase by settlers was prohibited. Instead block committees would decide on the terms of alienation, placing their lands with District Commissioners for auction. The role of the Native Committee in that structure was two-fold. It would receive notice of all blocks intended to go through the Native Land Court for survey so that there would be no more secret dealings, and would ascertain who were the owners of the block preparatory to the selection of the individual block committee."

The measure failed, however, to address Maori suspicion of any scheme which deposited lands into the keeping of Government officials, and fell short of their expectation that the mana of the land would be returned to them. Encouraged in their fears by speculators and free traders, Maori were reluctant to vest authority in block committees and refused to hand over land to the District Commissioners for ultimate disposal.14 In any case, the tolerance of Parliament to any trend towards slowing the pace of transfer of lands was short-lived and the Atkinson Ministry restored the system of direct purchase in 1888, representing the step as fulfilling a Maori wish to dispose of their lands as they saw fit, subject only to protections against fraudulent transactions. Ward points out, however, that the Native Land Act 1888, was opposed by much of Maori leadership, and that its `rapacious character' was revealed in the relaxation of restrictions on alienation. The Maori demand for an end to the encroachments of the Native Land Court, and for a means by which lands could be restored to tribal control so that individual owners could not sell their community inheritance on the open market remained unsatisfied, and was to form a major thrust within kotahitanga policies in the following decade."

(b) Public works: friction at 1880

Grievances other than the operation of the land court also surfaced in the discussions between the Hauraki people and Ballance in 1885. The question of Maori rights in relation to the 'public good', at issue from the very early years of settlement, became

12 A. Ward, Wai 48 and others: Whanganui ki Maniapoto Land Claims. Preliminary Historical Report to the Waitangi Tribunal', 1992, p. 63.

13 See Ballance in 'Notes of Native Meetings', AJHR, 1885, G-1, p. 31. Doc. 3, p.8.

14 Ward, Show

vvaru, oyow ofJustice, pp. 296-297.

15 Ibid., p. 298.

24

Chapter I: Government Policy and Maori Reaction, 1880-1890

increasingly urgent by the 187os. We have seen, in Volume 4, that the Government's desire to facilitate the opening of the interior by improvement of the navigation of the Waihou River, the construction of the road along the east bank, and of a railway to Ohinemuri connecting to Waikato and Tauranga, ran into resistance from Maori on a number of points. Opposition related to the complex intermingling of tribal interests generated by the rich resources of the area and the continuing support for the King movement in the delta and up-river region. But considerable suspicion also existed among Maori about whether the Government would construct roads and railways over their lands without their consent, and whether it was intended to take land without payment. Other issues also arose: the right of Maori right-holders to receive payment for stones and gravel taken from Hikutaia Creek for railway ballast, whether Maori interests were considered by Government in decisions as to where lines should run, and whether they would be subject to road taxes.

The focus of Maori complaint when the Hauraki iwi met with Ballance in 1885 was the practice of road building—and in particular, the neglect of protections—rather than the power of the Government to take land for public works. They complained that the route of roads at best ignored Maori needs while respecting Pakeha interests; at worst, took essential Maori lands to avoid taking those of European owners. The perception of favouritism in the construction of roads had played a role in the resistance at Komata.16 Tareranui who participated in the meetings between Tukukino and the Chairman of the Thames County Council in 1880, drew attention to the issue, implying that the needs of the Maori community were being neglected:

[T]he County Chairman seemed anxious to have a road made which according to his showing would confer a benefit upon only one person whereas he had some forty or fifty others living at Opakura who had no means of access to Paeroa without breaking down fences and otherwise trespassing on lands sold to Pakehas.17

He repeated this sort of complaint in the meetings with Ballance. Tareranui drew first on the example of Paeroa township where Maori reserves were transected:

The Council have determined to run a road right through the Native cultivations. The Maoris say "No; it should not be so, because you take land from us that is available for cultivation." The Council say, "We want to do it in order to make the road straight." Now there is a European block close to it; the road goes over it, but the road is bent, and the Council never attempted there to straighten it; but over this Maori land they straighten it by taking it through the land. The portion where the road goes over Maori land is called "Te Pure-o-te-Rangi."18

Beyond this point the road would take in another three or four acre block of Maori land remaining in the township. Tareranui then condemned the way in which the road to Te Aroha was laid out:

16 See discussion in R. Anderson, The Crown, the Treaty, and the Hauraki Tribes, 1800--188s, Hauraki Maori Trust Board, Paeroa, 1997, pp. 253-261.

17 'Notes of a meeting ... August 30 1880.' In Komata special block file. MA 13/44

18 'Notes of Native Meetings', AJHR 1885,G-1, p. 33. Doc. 3, p.10.

25

THE CROWN, THE TREATY, AND THE HAURAKI TRIBES, 1880-1980

They have run it through the centre of the native lands: as soon as they came to a block owned by Europeans, they turned it off directly and ran it through a Native block—they avoided the European block. When they got to a piece owned by Mr Bennett, they took only a very small portion indeed off it. As soon as they crossed the river, directly on the other side was a Native block of land all under cultivation, and they ran it right through that.19

A similar criticism was made by Hoani Nahe—that the Government in giving power to county councils to take land for roading purposes had exposed Maori to discriminatory practices. He complained that the county had been able to put four roads through a Maori block to give access to European-owned lands but that the same courtesy was not extended to Maori when they required access to the main county road.2° Others such as Ngapari and Tamati Waka protested that tapu places were degraded when roads and other public works were taken through. Tamati Waka questioned, for example, why the Council should take a road over Wairau Te Rangaitapu, arguing that the road over Totara should be sufficient.21

Ballance gave assurances to the Hauraki leaders that due regard for their wishes would be given in the matter of where roads would be laid. He made on-the-spot concessions, directing that a 'deviation' be made to accommodate Tareranui's complaints and promised that, in future, surveyors would be directed to take the road with least possible injury to Maori cultivations. He assured the Hauraki gathering that surveyors had been given instructions to be careful where they took roads and that any complaint brought to the Government would be fully investigated.22 Whether these guarantees were upheld still requires investigation.

Closely connected to complaint about the lack of consultation with Maori over the construction of roads and public works on their land, was the issue of rates. The increasingly dominant Government view was that Maori equally benefited from public works development and, despite lack of representation within local bodies, they were expected to uphold the duties of ownership by paying the rates which supported those undertakings. But K. Marr argues that Maori for their part, 'could not see why land they had held for centuries ... should suddenly become subject to taxes often when they saw no benefit from them.' Many saw the imposition of rating as simply another Government device to acquire land from them.23 In the Hauraki district, the resistance to the county road being built from Thames to Paeroa was partly grounded in the fear that its construction would make the adjoining blocks liable to rates, and the local county council was eventually obliged to enter into an explicit arrangement promising that the area would never be subject to this sort of tax. These events are discussed in greater detail in Chapter Five where it will be suggested that the arrangements reached between Ngati Maru and the Thames County Council failed to bridge the gap between the expectations of Maori

19 Ibid. Doc. 3, p.10.

20 Ibid., p. 37. Doc. 3, p.14.

21 See speeches of Tamati Waka and Ngapari, ibid., pp. 37-39. Note also ongoing protest of Tukukino with reference to ferry landing site at Te Puke on Thorp's land' at p. 34. Doc. 3, p.n.

22 Ibid., pp. 33, 40. Doc. 3, pp. 10, 17.

23 K. Marr, `Public Works Taking of Maori Land 1840-1981.' Report prepared for Treaty of Waitangi Policy Unit, December 1994, p. 84.

26

Chapter I: Government Policy and Maori Reaction, 1880–1890

and European. The agreement had a prominent place in tribal memory, being interpreted by the Hauraki people as a recognition of their ongoing contribution to the development of the district, and as binding for all time. In contrast, the Government tended to accord the agreement no status at all, seeing it as extra-legal and essentially meaningless.

Crown Purchasing, 1880–1890

(a) Introduction

The administrations of the late 1870s and 1880s were characterised by retrenchment. Reductions in the Native Department's powers began in 1876. The Government took stock of its expenditure of money on land purchase in the Hauraki district where finalisation of transactions had frequently been long-delayed because of intermingling tribal claims and the strongly held anti-selling views of sections of the right-holders. That resistance could be undermined only by the slow build-up of debt, the purchase of signatures under the Native Land Act 1873, and eventual excision of the minority interests of the hold-outs. The primary task of land purchase officers in the late 1870s and early 1880s was, thus, not to initiate new purchases, but to push through those transactions initiated by James Mackay in the early 1870s. The Te Aroha, Moehau, Waikawau, and Ohinemuri blocks, with the exception of the excised A subdivisions for the remaining `non-sellers', all finally passed into the Crown's hands after more than a decade of negotiation, pressure, and tampering with tribal authority. These purchases have been discussed in the first part of this report. The finalisation of the Crown's dealings in Piako proved more elusive, however, and the Government was unable to get Maori to put the area through the land court until 1889. It will be seen in later discussion that the Government's success in finally arranging for the area to be surveyed and brought through the Native Land Court, marked a new phase in Crown purchase in the Hauraki rohe. A revival of interest in acquiring land for settlement, technological advance permitting extensive swamp drainage, and the costs of survey and court hearings, came together to promote the transfer of the last large area of Maori land into the hands of the Government between 1895 and 1912.

The formation of the Hall Ministry, in 1879, and the ascent of John Bryce to position of Native Minister were followed by further Government retrenchment. There were cutbacks in all branches of native policy. Maori reserves which were vested in the Crown, transferred to the control of the Public Trustee, while the Thames district was amalgamated with Waikato, leaving Hauraki without a permanent Native Department officer. Wilkinson's duties often called him elsewhere, and Puckey who had acted as native agent for the past decade was laid off. The list of assessors was also reduced, although not dismantled entirely since the retention of able men was considered desirable to 'influence the general conduct of the Natives and indirectly assist ... in maintaining order and peaceful habits in their localities.'24 It will be seen that the remaining assessors

24 Cited in Ward, Show of Justice, p. 282.

27

THE CROWN, THE TREATY, AND THE HAURAKI TRIBES, 1880–1980

were expected to prove their worth when it came to furthering survey and acceptance of land court adjudication which was being resisted by sections of the Hauraki iwi with rights in the floodplain, including by some who had long been identified as 'friends' of the Government. At the same time, the grip of the 'law' tightened as a firm line was taken with recalcitrant Maori at Komata and Pukehange, and the control of settler and European Government consolidated.

Under the administrations of Bryce, Rolleston, and Ballance restrictions on the alienation of reserved lands were generally kept in place at Hauraki, reflecting both a general predisposition on the part of these Ministers (1879–1887), and early warnings from officers in the field that the 'improvidence' of Maori at Te Aroha, and elsewhere in the district, was likely to prove a problem for the Government if these lands went too. Those scruples applied, however, only to lands which had been specifically reserved for vendors by deed and court, not to lands reserved by Maori themselves from these large-scale transfers of the tribal estate. Thus, a number of the Ohinemuri A subdivisions were purchased by the Crown soon after the bulk had been awarded to it in 1882. The Government saw the subsequent purchase of Ohinemuri lands as a completion of earlier dealings, and its haggling over price was, thus, justified because the owners were simply seen to have held onto those lands in order to get a better rate per acre. Numbers 3A, 5A, 8A, 9A, 11A, 14A, 15A, 18A, and Owharoa 3A (1, 203 acres) had all gone by 1886, generally at 6/- per acre.25 Then, in the following year, the Crown applied to have its interests defined in the A subdivisons in which it had not been able to purchase all shares. This totalled 4,623 acres in 2A1, 4A1, 7A1, 13A1, 16A1, 17A1, 19A1, and Owharoa 2A1. Reserves were not considered to be required to be set aside for the new vendors. Maori asked what their entitlement would be, but the Native Land Purchase Department instructed its officer, in August 1882:

In purchasing the interests of unsold grantees cut out from the Ohinemuri Blocks by the Native Land Court last month, you will please explain that no further reserves will be made. The price per acre you are authorised to pay for the land is six shillings, the extra shilling is an equivalent to the reserves set apart for those who sold prior to Court making the orders.26

The logic of this instruction is doubtful, however, since some of the original sellers had been estimated to be in receipt of monies well in excess of their shares while the non-sellers had been excluded absolutely from the reserves for vendors and were now left with few interests in the district.

After the first hearings, the Crown had gained complete ownership of some 60,000 acres of the Ohinemuri gold field.27 A continuation of Government purchase left Maori, in 1887, with 26,233 acres out of the 32,059 acres that had remained to them after the original award, either as reserves and excised interests, or as lands held back, most of which had

25 Block 14A was sold for 8/-, 15A for 10/- and Owharoa 3A for 20/- per acre. See D. Alexander, The Hauraki
Tribal Lands, Hauraki Maori Trust Board, Paeroa, 1997, Ohinemuri 14 & 15 in Part 3, pp. 86–87, 146.

26 Under Secretary Native Land Purchase Department to Wilkinson, 7 August 1882. MA MLP 1889/268. Cited in Alexander, The Hauraki Tribal Lands, Part 3, p. 55.

27 This figure includes 706 acres of land that was mistakenly treated as belonging to the Crown, but excludes the Crown-granted reserves for the vendors (6,644 acres).

28

Chapter 1: Government Policy and Maori Reaction, 1880–1890

TABLE I: CROWN PURCHASES IN HAURAKI LANDS, 1880–1889

Acreage   Date of

Block   to Crown purchase Comment

Source: Alexander, The Hauraki Tribal Lands

29

THE CROWN, THE TREATY, AND THE HAURAKI TRIBES, 1880-1980

MAP 2: ALIENATION OF MAORI LAND AT 1885

30

Chapter I: Government Policy and Maori Reaction, 1880–1890

then gone through the court as Ohinemuri no. 20 in 1884. The Crown-granted reserves and Ohinemuri no. 20 remained largely untouched, at this stage, but it may be briefly noted here, that much of this area was also purchased over the next ten years as another 19,557 acres (mostly in no. 20) transferred into the hands of the Crown.28 These sales were required, in part, to pay the costs of fighting out title in court. The land purchase officer of the time, Gilbert Mair, reported in 1894, for example, that Ngati Koi were in 'such want of money for Court fees' that he would be able to acquire shares in the reserve in no. 17 at a lower price than had been previously possible.29 Other blocks, Otuturu 2, Waiomu 1 and 2, and Waikawau North were also sold in order to pay for the costs of the Ohinemuri hearings. It will be seen in following chapters, that the Government, for its part, became increasingly willing to acquire 'reserved' areas in the 1870s, as part of an effort to bring 'idle' Maori lands into production and settlement.

Up until the late 1870s, Crown agents had readily paid deposits on blocks, and almost all offers of land had been accepted. Now, the Government acted with more circumspection, but it remained willing, whenever costs permitted, to further the wishes of the local European community even though this would mean the loss of the most valuable lands left to Maori. Despite general retrenchment, the Crown would pursue new purchases if some 'urgency' was perceived—if lands were seen to have some particular value, most usually in terms of their sub-surface attributes, or for a public works or development project. Public bodies and local settler communities played an important role in prompting Government interest in Hauraki lands on these grounds. Thus, Mangakirikiri South 3A block (409 acres) was purchased at the suggestion of the Thames local politicians since it held the only unpolluted waters suitable for the domestic and drinking purposes of the borough. Waiu (eight acres) was purchased in 1879–1880 at the request of the Thames County Council as a source of metal, and in order to satisfy Maori who were unwilling to allow the county road to be taken through while the block remained in their hands. The Native Land Court had entered restrictions against alienation in the title in 1873 because evidence had been given that the block was a wahi tapu. These were, however, removed by the Governor once the purchase had been fully arranged for £125.30

(b) Te Aroha hot springs and township

The Crown also acquired the long-valued hot springs and surrounding lands at Te Aroha.31 The circumstances of the first transaction by which the 20 acre block containing the hot springs transferred into the Government's hands are not entirely cleat Certainly local politicians were concerned that the springs be obtained, the Mayor of Thames requesting Sheehan to instruct Mackay to reserve the area as public property.32 As a result of the following negotiations which finalised the purchase of Te Aroha block in

28 These figures have been calculated on the data provided in Alexander, The Hauraki Tribal Lands, Part 3.

29 Mair to Chief Land Purchase Officer, 20 November 1894. MA MLP 1920/31. Cited in Alexander, The Hauraki Tribal Lands, Part 3, p. 99.

30 See Alexander, The Hauraki Tribal Lands, Part 2.

31 For legends associated with the springs, see Ernest Bush, 'Te Aroha Mountain of Love', Te Ao Hou, 76, 1975, pp. 62–63.

32 Thames Advertiser, 20 August 1878.

31

Chapter I: Government Policy and Maori Reaction, 1880–1890

putting aside its reluctance to remove restrictions on alienation. In 1886 Wilkinson reported that the Te Aroha Domain Board was anxious to acquire Section 15, Block ix Aroha Survey District, comprising some 45 acres surrounding the reserve lands on which the springs were located. He asked George Lipsey to use his influence, and suggested that the price of the area should be kept low, again, because the owners would supposedly benefit from the township's economic growth:

I may state that, in my opinion, considering that this additional area is required for the purpose of improving and adding increased prosperity to the township of Te Aroha, in which she and her co-owners are considerably interested, a nominal or small price only should be asked for the portion sought to be purchased.41

The Under Secretary of the Native Department thought that the price set by the owners, £5 per acre, was 'very reasonable considering the proximity of the land ... to a rapidly rising township.' While querying whether such an acquisition—for endowment to the Domain Board—was really contemplated by the general legislation, he approved the purchase as desirable on 'general public grounds'.42 The warden of the gold field began to acquire interests on the Crown's behalf, and once a majority of signatures had been obtained, forwarded the deed to the Governor for certification of his consent to the removal of restrictions on alienation which had been placed on the reserve. This was duly given and each of the owners also signed a declaration designed to satisfy the Trust Commissioner that the sale was bona fide.43 Problems arose, however, with regard to succession which needed to be determined by the Native Land Court. In one case, the court dismissed the application for succession because the applicants claimed under a will in which a number of trusts were imposed. The Native Department sought the advice of the Chief Judge who recommended that the sale could be authorised by a Special Powers and Contracts Act. But when Mr and Mrs Lipsey (Ema Mokena) who were in the position of trustees for the minor concerned (Rina Mokena) insisted on exchange of land rather than an outright alienation, the Government decided to let the matter stand over. Eventually, in 1889, the Crown applied for partition, and two further shares were obtained, leaving only that problematic interest of Rina Mokena to be acquired. In 1893 it was decided that the difficulties preventing the finalisation of the purchase could be remedied by legislation, and the Maori Real Estate Management Act 1888 was amended at the last minute to state that 'notwithstanding any restrictions, conditions, or limitations in the will of Rina Mokena', the trustees could complete the sale of Section 15, Block ix to the Crown. The purchase of the Domain extension was completed by the end of the year.

The prosperity of Te Aroha township over the next 30 years was directly related to the development of the baths which had followed on from the original gift of that part of the Omahu Reserve. At the same time the agreement of Maori to hand over control of the springs, and to allow development of them, was clearly predicated on the belief that they would continue to use the resource, and by implication, play a role in the growth of the

41 Wilkinson to George Lipsey, 24 February 1886. MA MLP 1893/268. Cited in Alexander, The Hauraki Tribal Lands, Part 3, pp. 153–195.

42 Under Secretary to Native Minister, 5 July 1886. Ibid., p. 77.

43 See Alexander, The Hauraki Tribal Lands, Part 3, pp. 153–195.

33

THE CROWN, THE TREATY, AND THE HAURAKI TRIBES, 1880–1980

area. It will be seen in later discussion that, instead, Maori were increasingly pushed aside, as the Government at the behest of the Te Aroha Town Board and local residents actively sought the purchase of their remaining properties in the township.

(c) Purchase of the gold field blocks

The gold fields also provided an exception to the Crown's reluctance to purchase in these years, although the reaction to claims of mineral wealth was more cautious than in the late 1860s and 1870s. The old profitable seams had been largely worked out and the imperative of acquisition, already muted by the cession agreements, had declined further. Nonetheless, efforts to purchase continued to be stimulated by occasional new workings, local pressure for the securing of the freehold of those blocks which still produced some revenue, the general belief that such lands should not pass into the hands of private parties, and the Government's desire to relieve itself of obligations under the original cession agreements. It pursued the purchase of a number of blocks within the proclaimed gold field with varying degrees of success. Negotiations for Kaipitopito, Te Kapua no.

and 2, Opitomoko-Kuranui, Hikutaia no. 4, Manaia no. 1A, Waiau no. 1A, Waiotahi, Te Ipu o Moehau, and Moehau 4 may be placed in this category. Four cases studies have been drawn from the histories of these blocks to illustrate Crown policy with regard to acquisition of gold field blocks in the 1880s.

Waiotahi A

Sheehan's administration reaffirmed the general standing of the Thames gold field blocks within the Government's priorities in the district, the Minister writing to his land purchase officer (Wilkinson) in early 1879:

The municipal authorities have again been urging upon me the desirability of purchasing the freehold of the Gold Fields adjoining Grahamstown and Shortland. I have some idea that the L.P. Officers have always held a standing authority to purchase if opportunity offered, but to make sure I renew the authority I doubt very much if you can succeed. At the same time it is as well that you should understand that we are willing to purchase if opportunity offers at a reasonable rate.44

Later that year Wilkinson reported that he had managed to purchase several blocks within the field, but was now fighting off competition from private purchasers for Waiotahi A. Arguing that this sort of land should form part of the public estate rather than going into the hands of speculators, Wilkinson did not contemplate that Maori should be encouraged to keep it. Instead, he implied that the time was ripe for the acquisition since the block was liable to go up in value, stating that the current level of revenues accruing from it (approximately £215 per annum in miners' rights and residence site fees) was at its lowest, and that 'with the increased opening up of mines, the revenue [was] more likely to increase than decrease in the future.'45 Wilkinson's request that he should be authorised to spend more than the £500 which Whitaker had allowed for the

44 Sheehan to Wilkinson, 15 Janurary 1879. MA MLP 1881/516. Cited in Alexander, The Hauraki Tribal Lands, Part 2, p. 310,

45 Wilkinson to Under Secretary Native Land Purchase Department, 18 December 1879. Ibid., p. 311.

34

Chapter I: Government Policy and Maori Reaction, 1880–1890

purchase was met by an increase of £250. The Aperahama whanau who owned the block insisted on £1,000, however, while Puckey, now acting in a private capacity, offered £800. The Government, claiming that the block had been proclaimed as under negotiation, refused to recognise the capacity of any private agent to effect a transaction. Its offer was increased to £900 but problems in the succession delayed finalisation, and in the end, a private purchaser succeeded in effecting his own deal despite Government efforts.

Alexander's work shows that the three owners, under imminent threat of prosecution for debt, were desperate to sell, and, in September 1880, had entered into a private engagement with a mine manger named Comer. Corner had been warned that his purchase would be illegal since the land had supposedly been proclaimed as under negotiation, but he had gone ahead, regardless, having found no record of any such proclamation. His solicitor informed Wilkinson of this fact, and that his client had obtained a power of attorney from the 'late native owners' by which he was to receive all miners' rights, residence site and timber licence fees.46 According to Corner's solicitor, the Trust Commissioner had declined to issue a certificate when Wilkinson had refused to make the necessary enquiry. Comer now applied to the Minister to direct the Commissioner to investigate the transaction.47 Two of the owners also wrote to Bryce, stating that they were in extreme difficulty because they had not been able to take payment, and were 'continually being brought before the Court and twice arrested.' According to Aihe Pepene and Reha Aperahama:

If the government had not said that they would buy the land, we would long ago have received the nine hundred pounds and been relieved of our difficulties. We ask you to allow our Pakeha to complete the purchase of the land so that we may receive the nine hundred pounds and get ourselves out of the clutches of the Europeans at whose instance we are being pressed, for we are in continual trouble.48

Wilkinson was instructed to do what he could to safeguard the Government's interest in the block. He sought the help of local council members and also approached Comer himself. Wilkinson reported that Corner was ready to fight the Government's claim but might be willing to accept a refund of his downpayment of £100 and compensation for expenses.49 But when the Solicitor General was asked for his opinion on section 18 of the Waste Lands Administration Act 1876, he stated that it appeared to preserve the Crown's exclusive right only to lands 'in respect of the purchase of which money had been paid on behalf of Her Majesty at the time the Waste Lands Administration Act 1876 became law.'50 Waiotahi A did not meet this case and Bryce directed 'we must give way and allow Mr Corner's deed to pass.' The Native Land Purchase Department then informed the Trust Commissioner that the land was no longer under Government negotiation and Comer's purchase was duly registered in 1882.

46 Brassey to Wilkinson, 27 October 1880. In ibid. p. 315.

47 Brassey to Native Minister, 10 December 1880. In ibid. p. 316.

48 Aihe Pepene and Reha Aperahama to Native Minister, 18 January 1881. In ibid. p. 316.

49 Land Purchase Office wire to Under Secretary Native Land Purchase Department, 5 April 1881. In ibid. p. 316.

50 Opinion of Solicitor General, 20 April 1881. Cited in ibid. p. 317.

35

THE CROWN, THE TREATY, AND THE HAURAKI TRIBES, 1880–1980

Te Ipu o Moehau

At Te Ipu o Moehau, land was purchased by the Government because hermatite had been found on it, and could not be worked under the cession agreements which related to gold only. A first small payment on the land of £6, made by Mackay in 1874, brought the block within the compass of the Government's powers over land under negotiation. The Government retained that prohibition against private dealing in 1878 when the block was notified under the Government Native Land Purchases Act 1877, as being under payment of money and entry of negotiation.51 Matters appear to have rested there until February 1881 when Wilkinson, as part of the rationalisation of the Native Department's efforts, recommended that the purchase be abandoned and the cash advances recovered. Within the month, however, he had changed his mind because the discovery of hermatite on the block was prompting local demands for the purchase, and he now asked for permission to go ahead, suggesting at the same time, that the Government also acquire the adjoining Ngamoraki block on which silver and lead had been found. Wilkinson advised that he would need to exceed the standard price of 5/- per acre given for land in the district because the block lay within the gold field and generated an annual income through miners' rights of some £17.52 The owners had no particular wish to sell, and on Wilkinson's further report that the majority were reluctant to deal with the Government because they would obtain a better price from a private purchase; the Native Minister approved the acquisition at 7/6d per acre.

Over the next two years Wilkinson purchased shares in the block, in one case, immediately upon the appointment of a trustee for a minor who had succeeded to one of the original grantees.53 Rolleston lodged an application to have the Crown's interests defined in late 1883, and the case came on some months later in July 1884. A deed of sale was handed in, and the court determined that the Government had acquired 1,245 acres out of the 1,850 acres of the original block. This represented the purchase of six shares and repayment of an advance of £6 (at 5/- per acre) made in January 1874, and left three unsold shares (605 acres) belonging to two grantees. In the following yea; the Crown went ahead with the purchase of the remaining land. An initial offer of 7/6d per acre was rejected since the block generated income from resident site licences and a battery site, miners were currently working a seam of hermatite, and it contained good firewood and some kauri. Te Arani Watana stated that she had been offered 15/- per acre by a leaseholder running cattle on the block, but who wanted only 100 acres. She was reluctant to accept the offer because she would then have to survey the boundary, and so would agree to 10/- per acre for the whole block.54 Wilkinson again strongly advocated the purchase of the area as being in the public interest:

I think, in the interests of the public in general, and the Thames Goldfield in particular, that Government should where possible acquire the freehold of blocks of this description, and,

51 NZ Gazette, 16 May 1878, p. 607.

52 Wilkinson to Under Secretary Native Land Purchase Department, 23 March & 19 April 1881. MA MLP 1886/36. Cited in Alexander, The Hauraki Tribal Lands, Part 1, p. 337.

53 See Alexander, The Hauraki Tribal Lands, Part 1, p. 338.

54 Te Arani Watana to Native Agent Alexandra, 16 March 1885. MA MLP 1886/36. In ibid. p. 339.

36

Chapter is Government Policy and Maori Reaction, 1880–1890

seeing that the adjoining land is already Government property, and that the Thames public are desirous and have frequently requested that these Native lands within the Goldfield should fall into Government hands as soon as possible, I am of opinion that this would be a desirable purchase to make, and would suggest that the offer be accepted.55

Approval was given and the purchase went ahead smoothly, the signing of the deed being witnessed by the Thames Resident Magistrate who, two weeks later, also certified the deed in his capacity as Trust Commissioner.

Waiau no. 1

At Waiau no. 1, as at Waiotahi A, Maori owners were compelled to sell some of their more valuable lands in order to meet pressing financial needs. The eight grantees were persuaded by Wilkinson to offer the block to the Crown for purchase in 1882. Wilkinson reported that he had seen a chance to promote the. Crown's interests when the owners had wanted to replace the present gold field arrangements for the payment of miners' rights and fees with an annual rental:

Acting under instructions previously received to purchase land within the Goldfield whenever opportunity offered, I have replied to the letter of these natives by suggesting to them that the best way out of the difficulty would be to sell the block to Government, but I did not fix any price per acre. ...56

The Minister decided to go ahead, noting that it was a 'pity' that Maori could not keep their income of some £120 per annum from the block, but that, as there were no restrictions on the title to keep out private parties, the Crown 'might as well do it' at the price (£600 for 1,098 acres) suggested by the Under Secretary of his department.57 Clearly, matters were not so pressing that Maori needed to sell at this price because it was another six years before the block was brought to the Government's attention again. On this occasion, Frederick Preece wrote to the Native Department that he had been offered the land at 14/3d per acre, but was sure that the land could be bought for 'far less' as it was 'only owing to the great want of money on their part, to pay their debts' that the owners had now consented to sell.58 The suggestion was not picked up, however, because the Government had 'no money to spare for this class of purchase', until 1891 when Cadman, the new Native Minister, instructed that the unsold shares should be acquired.59

One of the owners had been declared bankrupt and her estate was in the hands of the Official Assignee in Auckland who informed the warden (from whose office the purchase was being conducted), that E.T. Dufaur, a prominent local solicitor, was one of the major creditors. According to Dufaur, land close to the block had recently been sold to a Sydney Syndicate for £10 per acre and the assignee now asked for £3.10 per acre which would be the upset price when the land was put up at auction.60 Cadman dismissed the offer

55 Wilkinson to Under Secretary Native Department, 26 March 1885. Cited in ibid., p. 340.

56 Wilkinson to Under Secretary Native Land Purchase Department, 9 August 1882. MA MLP 1897/238. Cited in ibid., p. 211.

57 File note by Native Minister, 6 September 1882. Ibid., p. 212.

58 F. Preece to Under Secretary Native Department, 21 February 1888. Ibid.

59 Under Secretary to Native Minister, 24 June 1889, NLP 1889/165, Native Minister to Under Secretary Native Department,

60 Official Assignee to Northcroft, 7 July 1891. Ibid., p. 214.

37

THE CROWN, THE TREATY, AND THE HAURAKI TRIBES, 1880-1980

because the Crown already had the mineral rights, stating: 'The Official Assignee does not seem to be aware of the fact that the Crown has acquired the right to mine on this block. The price he seeks ... is out of all reason.'" Ten shillings was offered instead. By 1895 the Crown had managed to purchase four and a half out of the seven shares within the block and applied to have its interest defined. This was judged to comprise 706 acres, and the boundaries drawn to include the site of a timber mill and the gravel deposits at Pukewhau Creek, leaving the non-sellers 392 acres.62

Moehau no. 4

The secondary place of Maori within the thinking of the Government was most clearly demonstrated at Moehau no. 4, where the Crown decided to withdraw from the 1862 Tokatea gold field cession by which some right-holders were paid an annual rent of Lsoo. These terms were no longer advantageous to the Government now that there were few miners left on the block. The power to change the arrangements for the block was used by the Government's agents as a means to promote the purchase of the freehold, and the course of the acquisition was punctuated by coercive and manipulative tactics just as the original opening had been characterised by coercive and divisive dealings.

Crown acquisition of the freehold of the block was initiated in the 187os. Moehau no. 4 was included in the 1878 gazetting of blocks in the Hauraki district for which the Government had paid money and entered into negotiation for purchase. However, the nature of that supposed interest was unclear, apparently being derived from taking over two private agreements for the district." In the meantime, payment of the rent was suspended (from June 1878) pending the investigation of title, a challenge being mounted to the status quo which had been created by the Government and confirmed by its distribution of gold field rents. The case dragged on until 1882, when the Court finally admitted more people into the title." In the preceding year, the Crown's interest in Moehau no. 4 had come under scrutiny, the question arising whether the Government should maintain its claim against the block. The matter was still undecided when the block finally passed through the court. By this stage, £2,000 was owed to Maori, and Frederick Whitaker (Attorney General) wired Bryce urging purchase action:

Are you proclaiming Tokatea block? Desirable should be no delay. There is I believe a

considerable sum in rent belonging to Maori owners of block, three fifths of which awarded

by Court to two natives who are entitled to a considerable sum, and want an advance of one

hundred pounds each. I believe it would be well to purchase freehold as it would save a

considerable annual sum. ... The principal owners are here now and want to know what is

the Government interest.65

Bryce instructed that the 'advance' could be given, followed by proclamation, and Alexander points out that 'despite the £200 paid by the Crown being rent owed by the

61 File Note by Native Minister, 18 July 1891. Ibid., p. 24.

62 See ibid., p. 220.

63 See ibid., pp. 89-90.

64 For discussion, see ibid., pp. 87-89.

65 Whitaker to Native Minister, 1 February 1882. MA 13/296. Cited in ibid., p. 90.

38

Chapter 1: Government Policy and Maori Reaction, 1880–1890

Crown, a notice was gazetted in February 1882 stating that monies had been paid ... and that negotiations had been commenced for the acquisition'.66

The remaining rents were paid over in July 1882. Government officers now set about to purchase shares, the Native Minister (Rolleston) authorising the price of 7/6d per acre as opposed to the 10/- suggested by Under Secretary of the Land Purchase Department, or the 5/- which he himself thought the land worth.67 As a first step, the Government informed one of the owners in the block, Rihitoto Mataia who had purchased the interests of three of the other grantees, that the transaction was illegal since the block had been proclaimed earlier in the year. Two months later, Rihitoto's husband (Mr. Nicholls) travelled with those vendors to Auckland, where they signed a deed of sale to the Government.68 As the Crown acquired shares, it reduced the amount of rent it paid out.69

Little further progress was made in the Crown's campaign of acquisition except for the purchase of a few more shares by the gold field warden who had taken over Wilkinson's duties, at a cost more than £1 above the rate set by the Minister. Kenrick (the warden) then arranged for Frederick Preece who was considered to have 'great influence with the natives' to act on the Government's behalf in the matter. Two years later, however, Maori remained reluctant to sell. The Mines Department decided that the Government should withdraw from the rental arrangement, and pay instead the miners' rights revenues which came to a lesser amount. The Auditor General reminded the Department:

Notice of the existing agreements being put an end to, a fresh lease will have to be made, or all legal power to collect revenue and enforce the mining laws will cease. Native lands can only come under the Act at all, under the definition of 'Crown lands'. ...70

But nothing was done to draw up a new arrangement at this stage. Instead, Kenrick presented an ultimatum to Maori; that the Government would no longer pay the annual rent, but that the block would remain within the proclaimed field, nonetheless; and since they would now receive miners' rights only, they should sell. Preece reported that, in late 1885:

He [Kenrick] ... gave the natives notice through me that they would have either to sell their shares in the block to the Crown, or on the other hand they would have to content themselves by receiving the Miners' Rights etc in lieu of the £500 per year, as the lease to the Crown would expire on March 1st '86, and that the Crown would not consent to continue paying the rent beyond that date.

Mr Kenrick gave me a [written] agreement [on which to obtain signatures] .... Mr Kenrick desired me again to give the natives notice that the Crown would not pay any more rent ... and that they would have to either sign that agreement and accept the Miners Rights etc or sell the block to the Government, for which he on behalf of the Government would give them £600 per share. ... 71

66 Ibid., p. 90. See also discussion in MD 1/82/361.

67 Ibid., pp. 90–91.

68 Ibid., p. 91.

69 See Wakefield minute 16.4.83, on Kenrick and Wilkinson to Paymaster General, 29 March 1883. MD 1/83/483.

70 Auditor General memo., 5 March 1815. MD 1/85/70.

71 Preece to Native Minister, 21 February 1888, MA 13/296. Cited in Alexander, The Hauraki Tribal Lands, Part 1, p. 92.

39

THE CROWN, THE TREATY, AND THE HAURAKI TRIBES, 1880–1980

This offer was refused. Undaunted, Preece believed that the purchase could still be achieved with 'careful management' but that 'it would take time as there was no desire whatever on the part of the natives to sell, and ... they were very bitter with the Government for having purchased the other shares.'72 Maori subsequently complained, too, that they were 'never asked to sign [a] new agreement or consulted in any way, but were merely told that no more rent would be paid them, and that in future, they would only get the revenue that accrued from the land.'73

The local county council urged on the purchase, predicting that there would be 'considerable mining activity' in the near future, but the Government was unable to make any headway at the price of 7/6 being offered.74 In 1887 application for subdivision was made and soon afterwards the Crown applied for its interests to be defined. In the middle of the hearing, Wilkinson wired his Minister stating that Maori would agree to a sudivision which would give up 600 acres to the south-east of Kapanga Stream. He advised that this would be a 'very good' deal for the Government since that portion would contain nearly all the mines that had been in operation in the past ten years, although few were now productive. Only one mine lay on the north-west bank; however, Wilkinson calculated that this concern produced three-quarters of the current revenue of the block. He was duly instructed to accept the proposal, provided that Maori agreed to their retained portion being brought under the Mines Act 1886. Otherwise he was to try to protect the property of the English Company who owned the claim in question from possible seizure by Maori after they had been 'clothed in a new tide by the subdivision.'75

The owners of the block at first agreed that the gold field laws might remain over the block, but asked that they should collect the revenues for themselves because of the history of delay in payments by the warden, pointing out that they had been paid nothing since the termination of the rental arrangement two years earlier. Past problems were acknowledged by officials, but the idea of Maori taking over management was met with little enthusiasm. The Under Secretary of the Native Department responded:

Quite so. Questions should not be mixed; they should not however, be entirely overlooked. Please ascertain cause of non-payment of revenue to natives as complained of. Once the matter is settled delays of the kind will not be permitted. Natives would act unwisely to take the collection of revenues out of the hands of the Government. Please explain this to them as clearly as possible.76

The Moehau no. 4 grantees refused to give way, countering that since the Government had withdrawn from the original agreement of 1862, 'the land should revert to them unfettered with gold mining laws.'77 Wilkinson, now, advised caution:

The question seems to me whether, if the natives refuse to sign a new agreement, they have any case against the Government for keeping proclamation over block of land after they had

72 Ibid., p. 93.

73 Wilkinson to Under Secretary Native Land Purchase Department, 27 October 1887. Ibid., p. 98.

74 Acting Under Secretary Mines to Chairman Coromandel County Council, 2 December 1886. MD 1/86/2238.

75 Under Secretary Native Department to Native Agent, 24 October 1887. MA 13/296. Cited in Alexander, The Hauraki Tribal Lands, Part 1, p. 95.

76 Under Secretary Native Department to Native Agent, 25 October 1887. In ibid., p. 96.

77 Wilkinson to Under Secretary Native Department, 25 October 1887. Ibid.

4°

Chapter 1: Government Policy and Maori Reaction, 1880–1890

given up the lease which had given them the power to proclaim it a goldfield originally, and had allowed its (Crown's) own portion of it to be subdivided by Court. If they have any case would it not be inadvisable for me to agree to any subdivision that would throw the Kapanga claim with its valuable plant into the native portion, or to risk a subdivision by the Court which might give the natives that mine, as the Crown is only entitled to two-fifths of the whole. Under such circumstances would it not be better to withdraw case and let matters remain as they are at present, trusting in the meantime either to be able to purchase the unsold shares or that natives will eventually sign new agreement to get the revenue which is now in Warden's hands for them.78

Wilkinson acknowledged that the terms of the original gold field lease meant that the land would revert to the owners 'unfettered' if the Government decided to withdraw from the arrangement and failed to enter into a new one. He reiterated that it would be best to drop the case 'as the fact of Government pressing on subdivision shows that it wants to cut adrift from natives altogether and may incite them to test the legality of Government's annulling the lease before coming to terms for a new one.79

Initially, the Crown withdrew its application to have its interest defined. Despite the court's agreement that the case would be treated as merely adjourned if a gold field arrangement was reached, the owners continued to refuse terms. The Government, anxious to protect mining capital and determined to buy as cheaply as possible, was not prepared to let the matter stand any longer. Further pressure was applied for the purchase of Moehau no. 4, by Cadman, who wired Mitchelson in December 1887:

Would strongly its completion as matter of utmost importance to Auckland on account title to English company. Natives are now wanting money but will not deal with Wilkinson.80

Government officials were reluctant, however, to offer more than 7/6d per acre. The chief clerk of the Native Land Purchase Department noted that the owners having previously refused higher offers (of £3,000), should now be given no more than the standard price per acre—a total of £1,800. Mitchelson agreed that the price should not be 'very much more' than the 7/6d originally offered, but directed that 10/- or 12/- might be offered as it was extremely important that the matter be settled.

T.W. Lewis, the Under Secretary of the Native Land Purchase Department, was sent to negotiate the purchase of the outstanding shares. Again the payment of overdue gold field revenues from miners' rights was linked to eventual agreement to sell. Charles Dearle, a clerk in the Resident Magistrate and Warden's Court who was married to a local Maori woman and often employed by the Government to purchase signatures, was asked to assist in acquiring the share of Riria Karepe whose agreement was seen as the key to success. Dearle reported that Riria would not be satisfied with the £450 on offer since a large amount of revenue had accrued on the block, and suggested that the amount be increased to £500 or £525 to cover this debt, and depending on whether she was prepared to forego a so acre reserve. In February 1887 Lewis settled with her for £500, and her share of the

78 Ibid., pp. 96–97.

79 Wilkinson to Under Secretary Native Department, 26 October 1887. Ibid., p. 97.

80 See ibid., p. 99.

41

THE CROWN, THE TREATY, AND THE HAURAKI TRIBES, 1880-1980

revenues—some £32 out of the £217 which had accumulated, two-fifths of which went to the Crown because it had acquired the freehold of those interests. The remaining owners refused to deal until they also had been paid their share of the gold field monies. Lewis reported that he thought that they had a 'very exaggerated opinion of the value of their interests through reports current of the gold produced by the Kapanga mine and the large amounts to be spent by the Company.' He suggested, however, that Riria's signature had given the Government 'command of the situation' and that if the others refused to come to terms, their interests could be safely excised. Furthermore, the legal status quo was settling into a greater assumption of the existence of a royal prerogative over gold and other important minerals, challenging the past recognition of Maori right which had been inherent in the early mining agreements.81 Lewis implied that the problem of Maori agreement might be overcome, since 'Chief Judge MacDonald was suggesting that the question of the right of the natives to minerals at all has never been settled and he believes the right vests in the Crown here as in England.'82 The issue was not put to the test, however, because the remaining owners agreed to sell, receiving £750 each, and outstanding revenues, with an additional £150 going to one grantee. Lewis reported himself as reasonably satisfied with this price. Although it was greater than he had hoped to pay, the total price for these last shares at £2,150, was considerably less than the £3,000 offered by the previous administration, or the £2,850 authorised by Mitchelson.83 The news of the extinguishment of Maori title was greeted with enthusiasm within the Government, as being of 'material assistance' and a 'great boon' to the district since it had been anticipated that failure would result in the 'stoppage of all English capital to [the] Northern Goldfields:84

Summary

Gold and land fever subsided in the Hauraki district after the 1870s, by which stage the Thames and Coromandel fields had greatly declined, and the Crown had acquired absolute control of the majority of those lands at Ohinemuri and Waihi that were coming into mineral production. The slowing of purchase operations in the Hauraki district reflected this declining imperative, and general policy considerations—retrenchment, the initiatives of Ballance, and fear that Maori on the peninsula would soon be without any means of support. The administrations of the 1880s were more cautious in their response to offers and suggestions of sale than their predecessors had been. They were more suspicious of claims of mineral wealth and were reluctant to become involved in the same sort of long drawn-out negotiation that had characterised the purchases of the 187os.

These constraints on purchase were, however, always liable to be put aside in response to local pressure which generally concentrated on lands which appeared to have commercial

81 See discussion in R. Anderson, Goldmining: Policy, Legislation, and Administration,' Waitangi Tribunal Rangahaua Whanui Series ( working paper: first release), 1996, pp. 61-67.

82 Lewis to Native Minister, 13 February 1888. Cited in Alexander, The Hauraki Tribal Lands, Part 1, p. 102.

83 Lewis to Native Minister, 14 February & 1 March 1888. Ibid., pp. 102-103.

84 See Cadman to Native Minister, 14 February 1888; Native Minister file note, I March 1888. In ibid., p 103.

42

Chapter 1: Government Policy and Maori Reaction, 1880–1890

potential—township and mineral areas still in Maori hands. It was largely assumed that development of such areas depended on European control: that of the Government in the case of mineral blocks, that of settlers and entrepreneurs in the case of the townships which had been established to exploit the sub-surface resources of the district. Despite greater caution, administrations in the 1880s remained interested in areas of proven resource and commercial potential, and continued to act on the principle that lands containing mineral and other assets of particular value should be acquired whenever possible, in order to ensure Government control and to protect capital. Purchase was also pursued because the Government wished to withdraw from the old mining arrangements which meant that any revenues from miners' rights, licences and fees went into Maori hands. In those negotiations, the Government used its power to unilaterally revoke earlier agreements to push Maori into selling outright while continuing to act as though such blocks were still open to mining and under its management. At the same time, the Government's failure to properly manage those revenues impaired the ability of the Maori owners to withstand the pressure on them to sell their interests.

(d) The Purchase of Piako

Only one large tract of territory remained in Maori hands by the mid-1880s. That district comprising the Hauraki Plains (often referred to as the 'Piako lands') lay between the confiscation line and the Waihou River and formed the major focus of Government land purchase activity in the 1880s and for the next 30 years. In the 1870s and early 1880s policy with regard to the acquisition of 'Piako' lands shadowed that pursued at Ohinemuri, but completion of the purchase proved more elusive. Mackay again operated ahead of the Native Land Court, dealing largely with one party within Ngati Paoa who duly signed a deed committing the tribe to an alienation. Other tribes—Ngati Maru and Ngati Hako—and the non-sellers within Ngati Paoa then came under pressure to agree to the survey of internal tribal boundaries so that the interests of those who had accepted payment could be defined and transferred to the Crown. In the meantime, those groups were unable to come to their own arrangements with regard to any part of the Piako block, with any party other than the Crown, since the whole of the area (estimated at 200,000 acres) had been proclaimed as under negotiation. King supporters, based primarily at Te Hoe-o-Tainui and Te Kerepehi, found themselves tied to the alienation of tribal lands so that the debts of others could be redeemed, and were pushed by the Government to accede to survey and the authority of the land court. Other complications existed with regard to the area: the claim of the late Tarapipipi Te Kopara's people that Pollen had promised to exclude Te Hoe-o-Tainui lands from the confiscation boundary; continuing problems with the adjustment of the old land claims of Webster and others; and a claim from Whitaker for land in Piako in exchange for interests within the confiscation boundary.85

85 See NLP 81/112, 85/343, 81/35, 82/1313 in Piako special block file, MA 13/64 (b); AJHR 1877, G–7, p. 8.

43

THE CROWN, THE TREATY, AND THE HAURAKI TRIBES, 1880-1980

The first payment on the Piako land, much of it in the form of goods supplied by Mackay, took place at the great Whakatiwai gathering in 1874.86 Forty-eight Ngati Paoa had signed a deed which acknowledged on behalf of themselves and 'all' their tribe:

[T]he receipt by us of £4,500 paid to us by James Mackay Jr ... in part payment for our

lands adjacent to the rivers Piako and Waitoa and on the West side of the river Waihou

(Thames) and some pieces of land in the neighbourhood of Waitakaouru and Pukorokoro

which we have consented to sell to Queen Victoria."

The deed then set out the price that would be paid on each acre ranging from 3/- for the best quality land to 6d for the poorest swampy areas. The Government agreed to undertake the cost of survey and promised to set aside an area for permanent residence and cultivation. The block was proclaimed under negotiation, and over the next five years, Mackay and other agents working on behalf of the Government gave further downpayments and credit, amounting to some £16,500 by 1877. All but £500 of this sum had gone to Ngati Paoa and their kin, Ngai Tai, who had received a small secondary payment on the area.88 Wilkinson subsequently outlined part of the ensuing problem for the Government:

As you are perhaps aware, the Piako block is estimated to contain 200,000 acres and that the amount of advances already made on it exceed £17,000, a considerable portion of which will be found not well secured, and will require careful negotiation to get recognised at the present time as it was advanced some years ago by Mr. Jas. Mackay, and in some cases in large sums to two or three chiefs who are now dead. ... The great difficulty will I think be in the matter of accounts, so many of the Natives who are owners having had little or nothing, whilst others, on account of their rank and influence were paid very large amounts. It is most likely now that the Natives who only had small amounts will object to their land going as payment for advances had by others, and in which perhaps they only indirectly participated.89

Efforts to survey blocks in Piako drew immediate attention to problems with the purchase. In 1880 Hohaia Ngahiwi of Ngati Hua who had received no advances, initiated a survey of their interests for a privately arranged lease. Initially, the Government allowed the transaction to proceed, but withdrew its permission on Te Whetuiti's protest when the survey reached Te Hoe-o-Tainui, and on Whitaker's advice that the prohibition against private deals should remain since a large sum had been spent on the Piako area as a whole.9° Whitaker recommended that the land should be dealt with as one block and that: The time has come when this can be conveniently done and should be attended to without delay.'91

By 1880 the Government was becoming anxious to finalise its transactions. The Native Department had stopped the flow of money and credit to the area in 1879, arguing that it

86 See Mackay in 'Notes of several meetings with the Ngati Paoa Natives,' p. MD 89/148 in MA 13/64 (b). Doc. 4, p. 55.

87 Ngati Paoa Deed, 5 September 1874. NLP 81/167. In Piako special block. MA 13/64 (b).

88 See 'Reports from Officers, Purchase of the Land from the Natives,' AJHR 1877, G-7, p. 1o; NLP 79/355 for payments to Kaihau; NLP 83/54 discusses Ngati Maru payments, in ibid.

89 Wilkinson to Under Secretary, Native Department, 14 July 1881. NLP 81/260. In ibid.

90 See NLP 80/317, 573 and 679; for continuing requests see NLP 83/34. In ibid.

91 See Whitaker minute, 13 November 1880. NLP 80/679 in ibid.

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was time to see a return for its expenditure. Two years later, Wilkinson was instructed to arrange for a meeting with all the owners of Piako. R.J. Gill, the Under Secretary of the land purchase branch which had been recently constituted as a separate sub-department, advised the Native Minister that: 'Wilkinson's first action should be assisting natives to make application to the Native Land Court for title; subdivision would follow and a general settlement of the old and new purchases could then be made.'92 The field officer reported immediate success in 'getting all tribes with claims in Piako to send applications to the Chief Judge, except for the Hauhau party who were well represented at the meeting and did everything in their power to induce the others not to allow the matter be dealt with by the court.'93

Wilkinson now dealt primarily with Ngati Maru who, by this point, had the most to gain from the completion of the Crown's transaction with Ngati Paoa so that their own interests could be freed up for sale. They were persuaded to bring a claim before the land court but Wilkinson reported that the hearing, held in January 1882, had done little to put the block on a more satisfactory footing for the Government. Ngati Paoa had objected to the right of Ngati Maru to fix the boundary in court, and had left the courtroom in a body, signifying their intention to reopen the question. The line remained fixed on a map only.94 The strength of opposition—both to the claims of other tribes and to the sequence of court hearing, survey and sale—continued to thwart efforts to establish the boundary on the ground. In April 1882 Taipari and Te Pene accompanied Wilkinson and a surveyor up the Piako River and pointed out a spot on the west bank, seven miles above Te Kerepehi, as the starting point for the line dividing Ngati Maru and Ngati Paoa over to the confiscation boundary. Wilkinson reported that: 'In conversation, with Taipari since, he says that if the Government are anxious to have the line cut, and provided the cost of survey is not made a lien upon the Ngatimaru land, he is prepared to put it through with his own people.'95

Trouble over survey next broke out in Ngati Maru. Horomona Mahoetahi—a Ngati Maru leader, married to a Ngati Hako woman, and based at Te Kerepehi—immediately objected.96 He had been bound over to keep the peace for obstruction in November 1881, and now warned that he was unwilling for the survey to come to Te Kerepehi, maintaining that it had been agreed at the Whakatiwai meeting that the boundary would be fixed in court rather than a line cut.97 While Wilkinson did not anticipate violent protest, a problem quickly arose from an unexpected quarter. Taipari was not willing for a lien to be placed on Ngati Maru land for a matter which he saw as lying primarily between the Government and another tribe. He claimed that Gill had agreed that the Government would pay the cost. Bryce, however, informed Taipari that Ngati Maru would have to

92 Gill to Native Minister, 15 July 1881. NLP 81/260 in ibid.

93 Wilkinson to Gill, 23 July 1881. NLP 81/298 in ibid.

94 'Reports from Officers in Native Districts,' AJHR 1883, G–1, p. 7. Doc. 5, p. 95.

95 Wilkinson to Under Secretary, Native Department, 27 April 1882. NLP 82/1313 in MA 13/64 (b). Doc. 4, pp. 19–21.

96 'Reports from Officers in Native Districts,' AJHR 1882, G–1 p.4.

97 Wilkinson to Under Secretary, Native Department, 27 April 18 82. NLP 82/1313 in MA 13/64 (b). Doc. 4, pp. 19–21.

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THE CROWN, THE TREATY, AND THE HAURAKI TRIBES, 1880-1980

`bear their portion'. While they would not be required to pay for the cost of survey, the expense would be a charge on the land and would be paid by the purchaser when the land was sold. Taipari refused to agree to Bryce's terms and now declined to furnish anyone to point out the boundary on the ground.98

The Government insisted that survey should go ahead, short of active obstruction by Taipari.99 In dealing with opponents, the Native Land Purchase Department attempted to manipulate and then to intimidate Taipari to ensure that the Government's objects were achieved. Efforts to cut a line in early 1883 were, however, immediately halted by Horomona. Advising that Horomona's obstruction derived from kingite principles rather than the question of survey liens, Wilkinson recommended:

I would suggest that Hon Native Minister either communicate with Taipari and Hoani Nahe himself; or instruct me to do so, informing them that as he belongs to their tribe they had better restrain him, as, having again broken the law the consequences may be serious to

The Government took a firm line. Bryce condemned Taipari for the survival of kingite influence in the district and pressured him to quell Horomona's objections:

A friend I am grieved to hear of obstruction to survey in your District. [I]t is said to be by a man who does it on account of being an adherent of the King. I thought there was an end of nonsense like this in your district [W]hy should trouble arise out of foolishness like this. [I]t is your place as an Assessor of the Govt to use your influence to suppress a foolish proceeding as this is. [I]f the man persists in his folly the law must take its course with

him.101

In the following month Percy Smith instructed his surveyor to take a copy of Bryce's telegraph to Horomona and:

When on the ground give the Natives formal notice of your intention to carry on the survey and say that if any obstruction occurs the law will be put in force against them. Be sure to obtain names of any who obstruct in the future so that they can be summoned. If interfered with again report to me.102

Contrary to expectation, Taipari continued to withhold his co-operation. Lewis told Taipari, who had visited him about the matter, that it was his duty as a chief of Ngati Maru and a paid officer of the Government to use his influence to stop Horomona's unlawful obstruction. According to Lewis:

After fencing the question for some time [Taipari] plainly stated that Horomona's action was not as a Kingite but as a Chief and representative of the Ngatimaru and that the survey was obstructed because the Govt would not pay for it as arranged. I told him that this was still more serious because it involved the whole tribe including himself in the breach of the law that if they had a grievance they could address you by letter but that Ngatimaru had acted very wrongly in stopping the survey. I asked him what he was going to do. [H]e said he could do nothing. ... In total I think I have made him understand the serious position

98 Wilkinson to Gill, 27.1.83. NLP 83/41 in ibid.

99 Gill to Native Minister, 28.1.83, NLP 83/54; Wilkinson to Under Secretary Native Department, 23.2.83, NLP 83/1215. In ibid.

100 Wilkinson to Lewis, 27.2.8

NLP 83/1216. In ibid. Doc. 4, p. 22.

101 Bryce to Lewis, 28.2.83 NLP 83/1216. In ibid. Doc. 4, pp. 23-24.

102 Percy Smith to Jackson, 1.3.83. NLP 83/1216. Ibid.

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Chapter 1: Government Policy and Maori Reaction, 1880-1890

they have taken up and that you will not suffer any breach of the law or allow them for any reason to oppose the survey.103

Bryce sent a second telegram to Taipari that he was 'more grieved than ever' since it now appeared that the obstruction derived from 'objection and instruction to the law and the side of the court on the part of yourself and your people.' He warned, 'if it is a deliberate attempt of you and your friends to obstruct a lawful and proper order of the court, I shall regard it as a serious matter.'104

Two months later trouble cropped up again—this time, with reference to Ngati Hako rights at Te Hiku, on the east bank of the Piako River. Wilkinson informed Gill that it would be necessary to obtain the presence of Ngakapau, or Ngamapa from Coromandel, and Tamati Paraetai from Hikutaia, 'who in conjunction with Ngatimaru own the land in that locality.' Gill instructed Wilkinson to do all he could to put the land in a position where the court could finally deal with it. Wilkinson subsequently reported that he had made arrangements with Paraetai and hoped that the survey could proceed. Within the week, however, Marara Te Hikaiti of the Hingawaka section of Ngati Hako, wrote from Te Kerepehi warning: 'This is our word to you. It is not right (the survey in the vicinity of Te Hiku), it is for the whole of Ngati Hako to agree to it.'

Although a reference to the Pukehange shooting of 1879 appeared to threaten violent disorder, Wilkinson believed that it was 'not intended as a threat from all the Ngati Hako but as a desire on their part that a meeting should first be held with them concerning the matter, and their consent obtained before the survey is proceeded with:105 Paora Tiunga wrote from Te Kirikiri a few days later, stating that the line suggested by Ngati Maru in court was incorrect and reiterating Ngati Hako's right to be consulted on the question. He asked for time for Ngati Hako to discuss the setting of the boundary amongst themselves. Bryce was determined to push through and directed that there was 'no reason for delay,'106 but by September no progress had been made as Ngati Hako continued to refuse to point out their boundary with Ngati Maru 'until the question had been gone into and explained to them.'107

Since Ngati Hako objections were centred on Ngati Maru's claims on the eastern side of the river, Wilkinson arranged for a meeting between Pineaha Wharekohai on behalf of Ngati Hako, and Wi Kerei Te Whetuiti of Ngati Paoa. It was agreed that the cutting of Ngati Paoa's line on the west bank could proceed. Wilkinson reported that he was optimistic of a resolution of the matter; that Wi Kerei believed that now Ngati Hako had consented to the survey, the kingites within Ngati Paoa would also give up their opposition. A few days later, however, Te Whetuiti reported that he had been unable to persuade them to allow the survey to proceed: that all Ngati Paoa living at Te Hoe-oTainui objected. They were willing for the Ngati Maru line fixed in court to come out at

103 Lewis to Native Minister, 2.3.83. NO 83/1198 in ibid. Doc. 4, pp. 28-30.

104 Bryce to Taipari, 5 March 1883. NO 83/1216 in ibid.

105 Wilkinson to Under Secretary Native Department, 21 May 1883. NO 83/1530 in ibid. Doc. 4, pp. 32-33.

106 Bryce minute, 8.6.83, on cover sheet, NO 83/1582. In ibid.

107 Wilkinson to Under Secretary Native Department, 29 August 1883. NO 83/2810 in ibid.

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Hauhaupounamu—the line to which Ngati Hako objected—but they would not consent to the survey of the Ngati Paoa portion to be given up for raihana until this had been done. Wilkinson reported:

[N]ow that the Ngatihako obstruction has been removed, the Ngatipaoa themselves block the way. ... this opposition ... is set up by a section of his [Te Whetuiti's] people who have during the last few years turned Hau Haus or Kingites, and who, under their leaders of opinion Tiwai and Horomona Mahoetahi have always tried to obstruct or stave off any progressive works such as surveys etc in connexion with their lands. Their obstruction however was never considered to be of a very formidable nature, their great stronghold in connexion with the Piako survey being the more formidable opposition of the erstwhile violent and discontented Ngatihako. So long as that remained in force they left their obstruction partially in the background. Now that the Ngatihako objection is done away with and there is a chance of the work being completed, they come to the front again with the intention of still further delaying matters if they can.108

The completion of the Piako purchase continued to elude the Government which decided to allow the matter to drop until Maori were brought to a more amenable frame of mind by economic necessity, and made 'humble supplication for the work to be done.'109

In 1885 Ngati Maru submitted their claim to a portion of the Piako block but 'would not go beyond asking the court to refix their southern boundary line.' On the court refusing to make an order in favour of their interests to the north of the line, Ngati Maru withdrew their claim admitting that 'all they wanted was to get their portion separated from that of Ngatipoura [sic] so as to get the govt proclamation removed from it'. Neither Ngati Hako nor Ngati Paoa had made an application, or had agreed to the survey of their land. Sheridan advised Lewis, 'we had better appear indifferent for a time respecting Piako. The Natives will then perhaps put it through court thinking we are asleep.'110 The matter largely rested there until 1888 when the Government once again returned to the purchase of this last extensive territory remaining to the Hauraki tribes.

The failure of Ballance's 1886 land policy initiatives, and the coming to power of a new Government under Atkinson was followed by a revival of efforts to have the Crown's purchase in the Piako area defined. In 1888 T.S. Lewis, Native Under Secretary, raised the question with his new Minister:

It is extremely desirable that the large block of land known as the Waitoa and Piako comprising about 200,000 acres and which for many years has been included in the Returns of the Land Purchase Department as land under negotiation, should be passed through the Court, and the interests of the Crown defined.

Arguing that the Government had received little return for the £22,000 paid out (including a commission to Mackay of £2,500), Lewis noted that Maori continued to occupy the Piako lands as if they had never been sold:

Probably its greatest value is on account of the gum deposits, the extent of which I can form no opinion except that I Notice marks of gum digging in many parts of the Block—as the

108 Wilkinson to Under Secretary Native Department, 29 October 1883. NO 83/3484 in ibid. Doc. 4, pp. 34–35.

109 Gill memo. to Native Minister, 18.12.83, on cover sheet NO 83/3484. Ibid.

110 Sheridan minute to Lewis, 16.7.85, on cover sheet NLP 85/192 in ibid.

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Chapter is Government Policy and Maori Reaction, 1880–1890

diggers however are the Natives who are interested in the lands, and, who still exercise the right and have all the advantages of ownership, it is difficult to see what has been gained by the large sums of money paid."111

While Lewis did not believe that the area was worth any more expenditure, he emphasised that it was 'very undesirable to leave the matter in its present condition,' and proposed that a Government officer initiate negotiations to bring the Piako lands into court.

Over the next months the Government worked towards getting Ngati Paoa's consent for the land to be put through the court. A number of issues were involved in the following negotiations: the status of the lands falling within the confiscation boundary but still occupied by members of Ngati Paoa and subject to an agreement between Tarapipipi Te Kopara and Pollen in the early 1870s (discussed in Volume 4, in the context of the confiscation); the parameters of that agreement; the nature and size of the debt owed by Ngati Paoa and how this should be allocated against the land.

Responsibility for the Maori side of negotiations was taken by the Native Committee. Waata Tipa and Te Whetuiti (Wi Kerei) represented Ngati Paoa and referred proposals back to the communities effected. The Native Committee met with a series of Crown ministers and officials—Mitchelson, Stevens, and Lewis—in 1888–1889. It was soon clear, however, that Ngati Paoa did not have sufficient land to meet the debt accumulated on it at the original prices set down by the deed. In face of this unpalatable fact, the Crown could not insist on the strict terms of the deed signed in September 1874—the alienation of the whole block of 200,000 acres for sums ranging from 6d to 3/- per acre depending on quality.112

In December 1889 Mitchelson proposed that an area of 120,000 acres, exclusive of the area promised to be set aside for 'returned rebels', should transfer to the Government, calculated at the price of 2/6d. The Committee returned with their proposals which were presented in a series of meetings, first with Stevens, and then with Lewis of the Native Department in April. Attending on various days were Mackay and a gathering of people described as 'the Ngatipaoa tribe—representing Ngatihako, Hingawaka, Urikaraka, Ngatihura and Ngatipaoa hapus.'113 The area offered in satisfaction of the debt (Kopuatai no. 3 and 3A, subject to a reserve) was flatly rejected by the Government as inadequate. A counter-proposal was made by Lewis: that a total of 64,674 acres be transferred out of proposed subdivisions, in five blocks (including Kopuatai, and two blocks claimed by Ngati Maru.)114 The meeting adjourned for a week so that the people at Te Hoe-o-Tainui could be consulted. It was agreed there that an additional area commencing at Patatai and comprising Te Kohukohu and Mohonui (5,000 acres) might transfer to the Crown.

111 Lewis memo. for Native Minister, 28 September 1888. MLP 88/229 in MA 13/64 (b). Doc. 4, p. 41.

112 For copy of deed see NLP 89/262 in ibid.

113 See Notes of several meetings held with the Ngati Paoa Natives ... representing the purchase of Piako, p.6. NLP 89/48 in ibid. Doc. 4, p. 49.

114 Ibid., p. 9. Doc. 4, p. 53.

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Waata Tipa told Lewis that: 'At the line to the north of Patatai a certain area was not given up. Our word now is, that what is now offered is all we will give up to you.' 115

Lewis indicated that Ngati Paoa would not be expected to give up all their lands but

rejected the tribe's offer as utterly inadequate for the amount of money received in the

past. He pointed back to the deed signed in 1874, and to their individual responsibility: There is a deed in existence which parts with the whole of the land. That document gives up the whole of the land. That document gives up the whole of Piako. The Government do not wish to tie you down to the strict terms of that agreement. If they did so even at half a crown per acre the price proposed by Mr Mitchelson you would have to give over 144,000 acres, an area which it is figured, you do not possess. When you made the offer of 19,000 acres, Mr Stevens asked for 80,000. The additional offer now made is only 2,500 acres because Mohonui is Crown Land. I do not forget the alteration of the confiscated line that reduces the debt from £18,000 to £15,000.... The Natives should consider firstly the agreement they made—and secondly the amount of money paid to each of you.116

Negotiations then moved onto the question of the sums received, and who should bear responsibility for them. Aperahama Pokai claimed that while his individual debts had been placed against Piako, those of Urikaraka had been paid off by the transfer of Te Aroha and Ohinemuri. He now offered 'in addition to what Wiri Kerei and Waata handed over' a ten chain strip running along the confiscation line from Rataroa (Te Kowhatu-o-Ngaramania) to Pukekamaka, stating at the same time: 'We are all Ngati Paoa.' Lewis scorned the offer as 'too narrow for a bullock to turn in,' and flatly denied that Pokai was being charged with debts that had been cleared by the alienation of other lands.117 He placed the Government's offer before Ngati Paoa. £3000 would be taken off a debt of £18,000 to pay for their confiscated lands while they would have to find 50,000 acres out of their remaining Piako lands, estimated at 80,000 acres in total, in order to satisfy the debt still outstanding.

Over the next two days, the accounts were prepared and examined by the Native Committee. All individual items were acknowledged, except in nine instances of people not admitted by Ngati Paoa who also refused to take responsibility for a payment of £400 to Ngati Te Ata. In particular dispute, however, was the sum of £4,500, entered onto the 1874 deed. Mackay, who attended the meeting in order to explain the Government's understanding of the transaction, told the meeting that this sum was the original amount placed as a raihana debt against 'Piako':

It was not placed in sovereigns on the table. [P]art was in goods and part in money. You all know that you the Ngatipaoa gave a great feast in 1874 to the whole of the tribes of Hauraki.

I at their request went to Auckland for the necessary supplies and I nearly cleared out the stocks of flour in the hands of the Auckland merchants. The meeting lasted for a long time. A good deal of money was given to the people during its continuance. I saw the principal chiefs and showed them the accounts. ... It was included in the agreement when it was drawn up, and the agreement was read over twice in the open air before it was signed.... All

I have to say is you had the £4,500 and signed for it. The vouchers you have now admitted

115 Ibid., p. 15. Doc. 4, p. 58.

116 Ibid., pp. 16–17. Doc. 4, pp. 59–60.

117 Ibid., PP. 23–24. Doc. 4, pp. 66–67.

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Chapter 1: Government Policy and Maori Reaction, 1880–1890

were for money and supplies obtained subsequent to the meeting at Whakatiwai as the dates will show.118

Te Whetuiti (whose name was later shown to be on the deed) maintained that he had no knowledge of such a large sum having been paid, and demanded clarification of which hapu were involved.119 Ngati Paoa stated that they did not wish to impute dishonesty to Mackay—they merely wished to ascertain what debt lay with which hapu. Their complaint pointed, however, to the defective nature of that first transaction which had acted as a lever for the opening of the area. The Committee wrote to Lewis: 'We are not clear about this amount. [I]f you the Government can make it clear to us that we have received this money we shall be prepared to admit it as a charge upon our lands' which was clarified as meaning 'the lands of those individual natives who received sums not in all our land.'120 The two leading Committee members, Tipa and Kerei, accompanied by their agent (WA. Graham) subsequently visited Lewis, stating that it was unfair for the Government to keep the sum hanging over their heads when they could find no trace of who had received it, and when the largest portion of the money had been spent on food for the whole of the tribe.121

The majority of Ngati Paoa were anxious for the matter to be settled and admitted much of their debt to the Government. W.A. Graham suggested subsequently, that 'all sides now desire to finally close the Piako block. [A]djournments are impoverishing the natives and making them inclined to become sullen.'122 A finalisation of the sale to the Government was necessary so that the proclamation prohibiting private purchases in the area could be lifted, and other areas sold to pay off other pressing debts. They now offered a total of 45,000 acres in payment for the money they had received, a total payment of £11,776 being admitted. The areas they would transfer would comprise 23,742 acres that Pollen had formerly promised to return to Ngati Paoa within the confiscation boundary, Kopuatai nos 1, 2, and 4 (4,379 acres), 10,295 acres on the eastern side of the Piako River, Patatai which was marked no. 4 on the Government's map (2,500 acres), and 4,084 acres of land at Waitakaruru (marked no. 6).123 When Lewis again met with the Native Committee, at their room in Shortland, he announced the Government's disappointment at the smallness of area being transferred by Ngati Paoa and their repudiation of the original sums paid to 'them and their fathers.' Examination of the accounts had showed, however, that the hapu in receipt of the greatest payments did not have sufficient land to recompense the Government for its expenditure. He told them that, in these circumstances, the Government would accept their offer. 124

Piako was brought before the Native Land Court in early May. Taipari and several others withdrew their claims upon the land that, it was agreed, should go to Ngati Paoa. Ngati

118 Ibid., pp. 29–30. Doc. 4, pp. 72–73.

119 Ibid., p. 34. Doc. 4, pp. 77.

120 Native Committee to Lewis, 1 May 1889. MD 89/135. In MA 13/64 (b)

121 See memo. of interview given to Waata Tipa and others, May 1889. NLP 89/135. In ibid.

122 W.A. Graham acting for Ngati Paoa to Native Under Secretary, 30 July 1889. NLP 89/242. Ibid.

123 See HMB 20, pp. 293–299; also W.A. Graham to Native Minister, 22 January 1892. MA MLP 1892/8.

124 Notes of several meetings held with the Ngati Paoa Natives ... representing the purchase of Piako, p.38. NLP 89/148 in MA 13/64 (b). Doc. 4, p. 81.

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Maru, Ngati Whanaunga, and Ngati Paoa were stated as having interests in the area. Ngati Kea were also admitted, while an objection from Paora Tuinga that Ngati Hako had been omitted was met with reassurances that they came in under the aegis of Ngati Paoa.125 The general boundaries were then described as they lay between Ngati Paoa, Ngati Maru, and Ngati Hako, who challenged where Maru proposed to take their line. Ngati Paoa representatives then gave the names of grantees of the blocks which would transfer to the Government. On survey being completed, orders would issue to the Crown and the proclamation prohibiting individual purchase within Piako could be lifted.126

The Government could not be sure that ownership of the first major Piako blocks on the west side of the river would transfer to them until the lines were cut on the ground. The survey of Kopuatai went smoothly, but problems soon surfaced at Pukorokoro where Government survey lines came into conflict with Maori expectations that a reserve of some 7,000 acres would be set aside within the confiscation lands, according to Pollen's promise to Tarapipipi in 1870.127 Trouble next broke out at Kerepehi, where the Government attempted to erect a trig. station which would cover some 300,000 acres of land. Cheal reported that all the leading chiefs with interests in the region—Taipari, Hone Nahe, Nikorima, Ngakopa, Wiri Kerei (Te Whetuiti), and local leader, Ngamuka Ripikoi who had originally led the obstruction—were in favour of the triangulation going ahead, but that trouble continued. Obstruction was now led by the wife and two daughters of Ripikoi. Cheal blamed a small group who had been followers of Horomona before his death, but warned that the disaffection was spreading:

The persistent obstruction is having a bad effect. Waitakauru natives are watching my efforts with Kerepehi and the Ngati Hako have pulled down my station at Waitoki although it is the site of previous trig. points and had been up for 3 months.128

He requested that constables be stationed there, and when told that Wilkinson would visit the district in June, stressed that immediate, strong, action was required: 'Delays are always dangerous especially so in the case of natives. [I]f they are not 'fixed up' promptly and sharply it is like a leak in an embankment which for want of prompt measures becomes unmanageable.' Cheal argued that a strong course was especially required at Kerepehi where the absence of a chief meant that 'everyone residing there believe[d] he [had] the right to do as he like[d] in a free country.'129 As a result of these representations, Cheal was given authority to arrange police assistance and to prosecute any persons obstructing survey."°

Later in the year the King party became directly involved in the Piako obstruction as Tawhiao claimed responsibility for the Hauraki lands which had been placed in Potatau's hands for his safekeeping, and attempted to raise the issue of the war with the

125 Ibid., pp. 44-45. Doc. 4, pp. 87-88.

126 See NLC minutes, 6 May 1889 in ibid., p. 47. Doc. 4, p. 90.

127 See discussion above.

128 Cheal to Native Minister, 27 May 1890. NLP 90/169 in MA 13/64 (b).

129 Ibid.

130 See minutes, 31.5.90, on Cheal to Native Minister, 27 May 1890. In ibid.

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Chapter I: Government Policy and Maori Reaction, 1880-1890

Government.131 Kerei Kaihau, 'one of Tawhiao's people,' was reported to have pulled down the station at Waitakaruru, taking the trig. pipe to the post office at Miranda. The Government acted with alarm. Percy Smith noted that it was a 'very flagrant case ... setting the Government at defiance. It should be taken up or I fear the consequences'. Lewis concurred, suggesting that the King party were anxious to re-establish themselves in the district, that the Government had given every attention to every just complaint and that it was time now to take proceedings. The Chief Surveyor was instructed accordingly.132 Kaihau refused his summons, however, stating that he recognised only Tawhaio's law which lay with the Treaty. The three constables sent to arrest Kaihau, withdrew when confronted by a large gathering. A second force, comprising some zo police and over 3o militia was then sent to Tawhiao's settlement at Pukekawa, where Kaihau was residing, and he was arrested. Kaihau was discharged by the Supreme Court on the condition that he pay the costs of prosecution. At Waiuku he subsequently resumed his protest at Government survey of lands claimed within the King's mana. This development was interpreted as proof that 'leniency [was] only thrown away upon men of his class' who were politically-motivated, and that the law would have to be 'sharply ... administered to effect a cure.'133 In 1892 Kaihau was rearrested and sentenced to one year's imprisonment by the court.

(e) Summary discussion

Officials blamed the delay in finalising the dealings in Piako on the inter-tribal disputes about the position of boundaries, and a natural mendacity on the part of Maori seeking to repudiate past agreements. Discussions and subsequent efforts to survey the initial subdivisions revealed, however, a number of ongoing problems deriving from a breakdown in the relationship of Maori with the Government: lack of clarity in past understandings, the terms of which had been obscured by the passage of time, and concern lest the Government failed to observe past promises regarding reserves and the position of the confiscation boundary. Most of Ngati Paoa and its leadership were anxious to reach an accommodation so that they could meet their liabilities to the Government, and, on the lifting of the proclamation against alienation to private purchasers, pay off survey liens and other debts. The consent of communities living at Kerepehi, Waitakaruru, Te Hoe-oTainui, and Pukorokoro was, however, only reluctantly given and complicated by their connection with Waikato and the King Movement. The grievance arising out of confiscation, and suspicion of Government and the land court continued to colour the actions of these people during the course of negotiations characterised by insistent pressure and a measure of Government bullying. The eventual complete breakdown of that opposition as tribal rivalry forced the various right-holders of the delta lands comprising 'Piako' into the Native Land Court will be discussed more fully in the context of the impact of court and survey costs in that region.

131 See Lewis to Native Minister, 31.10.90; extract NZH, 15 November 189o, NO 9o/356. In ibid. Doc. 4, pp. 91-92.

132 Percy Smith to Under Secretary Native Department, 8.10.90; Under Secretary to Native Minister, 13.10.90, cover sheet NO 90/347 in ibid.

133 Reports from Officers in Native Districts, AJHR, 1892, G-3, p. 4

53

THE CROWN, THE TREATY, AND THE HAURAKI TRIBES, 1880-1980

In general, the pace of acquisition had slowed in the 188os. After the transfer of the freehold of much of Ohinemuri into the hands of the Crown, immediate interest in the Hauraki area declined, and the efforts of the Native Land Purchase Department were directed largely to the completion of the outstanding purchases of Mackay—in particular, that of Piako. In part, this slow down in the pace of alienation reflected the continuing hold up in that area, and in part, the simple fact that other than the Hauraki Plains, most of the Maori landed estate had gone. But, in part, too, awareness that Hauraki Maori had little land left, north of the Waihou River, and fear of the burden that might be placed on the state by the growing number of landless Maori in the North Island, meant that administrations of the 188os were generally reluctant to remove restrictions on alienation. Ballance's search for a compromise between Maori landownership and settlement, and the hiatus created by the Native Lands Administration Act slowed sale also. On the other hand, initiatives in purchasing being directed to the acquisition of some of the most valuable of the peninsula lands left to the Hauraki people—particularly those blocks still generating gold field revenues and the mineral springs land—and the last region to be kept closed to the Native Land Court, were all the more destructive to their well-being.

Any respite was short-lived. The reintroduction by the Atkinson Government of direct purchase and free trade in individualised title, and the loosening of restrictions on alienation of reserved land under the Native Land Act 1888, inaugurated a period of further 'onslaught' on Maori land. The Land Purchase Department had been waiting its opportunity at Piako, determined to see a return for its downpayments even though these had been given with little respect for the tribal and political complexities of the area, or for the rights of non-selling groups. The pace of acquisition once again gathered after the breaking of the deadlock there. The search for a means of establishing tribal controls proved fruitless and the destructive processes generated within the land court when issues of colour of right were bitterly fought over, continued unchecked. The inequitable weighting of the burden of costs in establishing title, most especially survey, also remained unchanged under the Liberal Government which introduced new policies designed to promote settlement in the early 189os. Furthermore, there was growing interest in the potential of the Hauraki Plains for dairy farming, and the transfer of the last sizeable lands of the Hauraki people was to be sustained in the early twentieth century by technological advances which allowed for the draining of the swamps. Despite efforts on the part of Hauraki leadership on a national level to stop further selling at a local level, Maori land holdings were to be rapidly whittled away. Most land selling took place in the delta area but the loosening of statutory and administrative protections on alienation of reserved lands meant that in the peninsula, too, Maori holdings steadily declined. These developments will be discussed in the following chapters.

54

Chapter II

CROWN POLICY

AND MAORI ASPIRATION,

1890-1914

Crown Purchases, 1890-1914

The pace of land alienation in the Hauraki district picked up again in the 189os. Over the next zo years, the Government, dominated by the Liberal Ministries, pursued an active policy of purchasing Maori-owned land in order to open it to settlement. That goal was effected through the provision of further funds, the construction of more effective structures of land transaction, and the Crown's manipulation of its power to control the conditions under which it entered into purchase negotiations with Maori. Crown preemption was reasserted, but at the same time, restrictions on the alienation of land could be removed at its discretion. Thus, most of the 'reserves' also went out of Maori hands in these years. The assumption was that Maori should not be allowed to render themselves completely landless for the sake of 'prudence'.1 But despite anxiety about the implications of the rapid decline in the position of the Hauraki iwi and the efforts of local leadership to control the pace of alienation, land loss was to speed up rather than abate. There were four significant areas of Crown purchase activity in this period: the Kuaotunu gold field; the Moehau and Waikawau reserves; the township properties; and most especially, the Hauraki floodplain.

(a) Native Land Laws Commission, 1891

The operation of the native land laws was re-examined by the Native Land Laws Commission in 1891. The setting up of the Commission signalled the Liberal Government's intention to overhaul land legislation, the confused state of which was seen as inhibiting security of title, and as blocking purchase and settlement. The Commission was to inquire and report on the 'operation of the existing laws to the alienation and disposition of interests in Native lands'; the practice of the land court with reference to those laws; the problem of titles which were defective because of non-compliance with those laws; and 'the principles on which interests in Native lands should in future be alienated or disposed of by or on behalf of the Native owners, and the manner, terms, and conditions in which the same can be carried into effect.'2 While the Commission held a number of discussions with Maori, they did not go to Thames. Nor does it appear that there was any meeting with Maori at Auckland, although the Commission heard witnesses there on two occasions. Hamiora Mangakahia based largely in the

1 Chief Land Purchase Officer to Surveyor General, 28 February 1895, on cover sheet NLP

1895/107. Maori Affairs Head Office file MLP 1896/219. Cited in Alexander, The Hauraki Tribal Lands, Part 4.

2 Report of the Commission ... into the subject of Native Land Laws', AJHR, 1891,G-1,p. iii.

55

THE CROWN, THE TREATY, AND THE HAURAKI TRIBES, 1880-1980

MAP 3: ALIENATION OF MAORI LAND AT 1890

56

Chapter 11:Crown Policy and Maori Aspiration, 1890-1914

Whangapoua-Moehau region did give evidence, however, reiterating the oft-expressed concern of Hauraki Maori for the impact of the land court and survey requirements on them.' When questioned how best to give effect to the will of Maori owners with regard to leasing, mortgaging, selling, and conducting other transactions concerning their lands, Mangakahia answered:

This is my reply with regard to lands that have not passed the Court: that in their case they should remain in their existing state, and that there should be no surveys and no Courts. I know where the difficulty will be in such a scheme as that. The Natives see that great evils befall them through the Native Land Court, and through the Survey Department, and through litigation generally.4

He then detailed the costs to Maori of establishing title:

[W]hen the Natives get their lands surveyed, the survey of the block will in some cases amount to 4400 or £600. [T]hat is only for the external boundary. Then come the internal subdivisional surveys, and these amount also to a very large sum, perhaps another £5oo or £600. And then, before these subdivisional surveys are made, there are large sums to be paid by the Natives for Native Land Court fees, and for agency purposes, and for other expenses incurred; and all these outlays are to be met from the 5s. an acre that is derived from the sale of the land. Then, if the natives sell, the proceeds of the sale are to go to pay for these expenses, and the whole of the land is absorbed in this way, nothing being left for the Natives.'

The Commission roundly condemned the state of the native land law which was described as giving rise to 'confusion, loss, demoralisation and litigation.'6 Brooking suggests, however, that the major concern of Rees, the chairman of the Commission, was to promote the development of the North Island by facilitating the settlement of Maori land which he saw as thwarted by monopolists. This was in line with the general view of the Liberal Government which adopted the more conservative recommendations of the Commission's majority report, setting up land boards with a Maori majority, reintroducing Crown pre-emption over strong dissenting opinion, and ignoring 'more awkward suggestions that Maori committees should play a greater part in managing Maori land and should encourage leasing rather than selling'.?

The nature and impact of Liberal policy and legislation on Maori landownership has been fully discussed elsewhere;8 but in brief; the Liberal Government shared the prevailing view that Maori held 'large tracts' of land, 'unoccupied, unused, barren, and untitled', and introduced a series of measures intended to facilitate the purchase of such areas for European settlement. Brooking has pointed out that the abolition of the Native Department and transfer of the Land Purchase Office to the Department of Lands and

3 Hamiora Mangakahia is described in the Dictionary ofNew Zealand Biography, vol. 2, as being of Ngati Whanaunga, Ngati Pare and Ngati Hei descent. For further discussion of his role, see p. 75-76.

4   Minutes of Evidence, AJHR, 1891, G-1, p. 36. Doc. 6, p. 102.

5   Ibid. Doc. 6, p. 102.

6 Report of the Commission on the Native Land Laws, Ibid., p. x.

7 T. Brooking, "'Busting Up" the Greatest Estate of All: Liberal Maori Land Policy, 1891-1911', New Zealand Journal ofHistory, 26, April 1992, pp. 84-85; Carroll, Note of Dissent, AJHR, 1891, G-I, pp. xxvii-xxx. Doc. 6, pp. 97-100.

8   See Brooking, "'Busting Up" the Greatest Estate of All', pp. 78-98.

57

THE CROWN, THE TREATY, AND THE HAURAKI TRIBES, 1880-1980

Survey in 1893 also removed an important institutional check on the too rapid alienation of Maori land. The impact of the loss of the Native Department was exemplified by a greater willingness among officials under the Justice Department, which had taken over its functions, to remove restrictions on alienation of reserved Hauraki lands.

Legislative measures were then introduced to facilitate Crown land purchase and the transfer of a secure title. The Native Land (Validation of Titles) Act 1892 was passed to invest titles and grant certificates in cases that were technically in breach of one or other of the multitude of requirements of the land laws. A Validation Court, with power to legalise transactions that it considered to have been equitable even if technically illegal, was established in 1893 to streamline the process, for example, Moehau no. 1 or Waikawau Reserve.9 Most controversial was the Government reintroduction of pre-emption. An initial step had been taken in 1892 under the Native Lands Purchases Act which prohibited private negotiations in areas gazetted for sale for a two-year period. The time limit was removed under the Native Land Purchase and Acquisition Act 1893, and full pre-emption was confirmed the following year, by section 117 of the Native Land Act 1894, which prohibited private dealings with native lands but saved all rights of the Crown. The legislation was presented in terms of protecting Maori from unscrupulous land sharks and to ensure that a reasonable price was paid for land, but was introduced over the objections of Maori leadership. Carroll, in his dissenting minority report at the Land Laws Commission of 1891, had objected strongly to the reintroduction of pre-emption because it violated the spirit of the Treaty of Waitangi, took away Maori control of their own resources, and was likely to keep the price they received for land at an artificially low level. The Maori members of the House reiterated these objections in the debates of 1893-1894, but Seddon dismissed as irrelevant their complaints that the measure was both unconstitutional and in breach of the Treaty of Waitangi.'°

In the same period, the structure of land protection in the form of restrictions on the title of certain blocks to be retained by Maori was dismantled, initially in favour of the Crown under the Native Land Purchase Act 1892 and the Native Land Purchase and Acquisition Act 1893, and then for any interested party. It became increasingly easy for Maori (often backed by a private party) to have restrictions on alienation removed, as requirements for unanimous consent were reduced, and, while the Crown had supposedly prohibited private dealing under the Native Land Act 1894, in the following year the Governor was empowered by Order in Council to except lands from the operation of section 117. Maori land holdings were thus exposed to a two-pronged attack. According to the Stout Ngata Commission, the Government's policy, despite numerous amendments in the land law, remained constant over this period; the 'vigorous pursuit of purchase by the Crown and constant use by the Governor in Council of the power excepting restrictions against alienation.'11

9 The Court granted title to the Kauri Timber Co. for 5,823 acres, even though only a few grantees signed the conveyance in 1885. Judge Gudgeon accepted this because the company was unlikely to obtain consent from the remaining owners deemed 'rabid Kingites'.   G2, p. 8 and G3, p. I.

Brooking, "'Busting Up", the Greatest Estate of All', p. 86.

11 'Interim Report on Native Lands and Native Land Tenure', AJHR, 1907,   p. 4.

58

Chapter 11: Crown Policy and Maori Aspiration, 1890-1914

(b) Crown purchase in the Hauraki peninsula lands

The major focus of Government attention after 1890 was the floodplain, but Table 2 shows that the appointment of Gilbert Mair as land purchase officer to the Hauraki district in 1894, and the revival of the Government's direct and active participation in opening native land to settlement also meant further purchasing in the peninsula area. Of particular significance here was the Government's interest in obtaining the freehold of Kuaotunu where gold had been discovered, and of township properties in order to satisfy the demands of local Pakeha politicians and residents, while serious in-roads were also made into Hauraki 'reserved lands' (to be discussed in the next chapter).

TABLE 2: CROWN PURCHASES IN HAURAKI LANDS (EXCLUDING HAURAKI PLAINS), 1890-1899

Date of Block   Acreage Comment

purchase   to Crown

1890   Hikutaia 4   3,350

Whangamata 2   5,487   removal of restrictions

1891   Manaia 1A & 2A   611   removal of restrictions on IA

Owharoa 5A   65

Taparahi 3A   575

1892   Ohinemuri 20A1   2,758

Otaturu I   653

Owharoa 4   z6

Tapapakaroro   93

1893   Te Aroha Hot Springs Extn   46   restrictions removed

Motukahakaha   516

Otaturu 2   87   completes Crown purchase of all block

1894   Mataitai 7   88

Ohinemuri zo A2 & A3, C   5,930

14 A BI IX; Omahu Reserve   52   restrictions removed

Otakeao 2; Waikawau reserve   975

Paeroa   162   restrictions removed

Taparahi 2A &3B   1,025

1895   Komata North 1B6   63

Moehau 1M   1,000
Ngati Taharua Reserve;

i nemur   434   restrictions removed Ohinemur

Otakeao IA; Waikawau reserve   98   restrictions removed

Taparahi C1   1,715

   Waiomu IA; Waikawau reserve 152   restrictions removed

Waikawau North; reserve   1,250   restrictions removed

Waipatukahu; Waikawau

   910   restrictions removed reserve

Waokauri A   48   B block sold to private purchaser

Whangamata I Reserve   100   restrictions removed

1896   Kakatarahae   3,189   includes 104 acres for non-sellers' survey costs

Kuaotunu IDI   122

Kuaotunu ID4A   7

Kuaotunu 3A   3,987   3B (l00 acres) &3C (213 acres) left to Maori

continued!...

59

THE CROWN, THE TREATY, AND THE HAURAKI TRIBES, 1880-1980

Date of Block   Acreage Comment

purchase   to Crown

1896   Marokoka

(coned)   Maurihoro A

Ngati Koi reserve;

Ohinemuri 17   999

Ohinemuri 20B1   316

Ohinemuri 20E   8,701

Owharoa 2A2   27
Waiomu 2A; Waikawau reserve 97

170 acres to non-sellers

81 acres left to Maori in B2 & B3 non-seller left 249 acres as 2oF

last of no. 2 except for I acre wahi tapu restrictions removed

2,540   3 reserves totalling 60 acres excluded from sale 1,181

1897   Horete IBI   124   1B2 sold to private purchaser 4 yrs later

Owharoa 5B1   27   2 acres comprising Mackaytown left to Maori in 5B2

Waikanae 2   575   almost 5o% of price goes to survey charges

Whangamata 6A & 6B2   6,855

1898   Ohinemuri 2A2   150   all lands in no. 2 have now been sold

Ohinemuri 4A2   189   " " in no. 4 " "

1899   Harataunga West IA, 2A, 3A,

4A, 5A, 7A   673

Oteao 4A   175   9 acres left to Maori

Source: Alexander, The Hauraki Tribal Lands

In the late 1880s gold had been once again discovered on Maori-owned land, this time at Kuaotunu IC, ID, and 2A on the Try Fluke Claim. Miners had been working the area for some time, operating on private, extra-legal agreements with the Ngati Hei owners. By this stage mining officials had largely lost sight of the old requirements for negotiation of formal consent before land could be brought within the Government's jurisdiction. As at Moehau 4, discussed in Chapter One, the warden first acted as though the Government had the power to bring the area automatically into the compass of the official gold field, making plans for a township to be laid out for mining purposes without first seeking the consent of the owners, and thus, interfering with already existing arrangements.12

The next impulse of the Native Department and Government, once it appeared that there was a chance of development of the Kuaotunu field, was to seek the outright purchase of the freehold. The Native Minister instructed his Under Secretary, in 1890:

When in Auckland it was stated that the Kuaotunu gold fields near Mercury Bay were turning out exceedingly good, and that the Government should take steps to acquire the land in the vicinity and within the gold field.

Have inquiries made as to area and price.13

Queries quickly revealed the complications of prior private purchase payments and lease arrangements which existed over parts of the land in question. These circumstances were first seen to make the acquisition undesirable. The initial report by an accountant within the Native Land Purchase branch was adverse, and the warden (Northcroft) was

12

13 Native Minister to Under Secretary Native Department, so January 1890. Maori Affairs Head Office file. Research on these events is intended to be undertaken by M. Russell, Waitangi Tribunal Research Unit. MA MLPI5890/144. Cited in Alexander, The Hauraki Tribal Lands, Part 1, p. 240.

6o

Chapter II: Crown Policy and Maori Aspiration, 1890-1914

instructed to enter into negotiation for a formal cession of mining rights instead. The Under Secretary of the Native Land Purchase Department soon reversed this decision, however, authorising an outright purchase if the owners would sell at a 'fair price' since this would simplify matters of jurisdiction and title. It was decided that the interests of those who had mining claims in the Kuaotunu blocks should be protected, but that Crown acquisition was desirable since all such claims would then be automatically subject to the mining laws?

The warden was now instructed to seek the purchase but, on the advice of the Surveyor General, was authorised to offer only £2 per acre for the area. Northcroft considered this offer as insufficient to interest Maori and continued to seek signatures to a deed of cession of mining rights instead of a deed of sale transferring the entire freehold. The agreement of scattered individual owners was slowly obtained over a two-year period, and the three blocks declared to be open for mining purposes in February 1892.15 That limited transfer of rights was, however, soon followed by a more extensive alienation as some owners, who were both in debt and in dispute about the partition of Kuaotunu ID, attempted to avoid further liabilities by selling the freehold to the Government. In April 1896, the Court awarded 1D1 to the Crown. The impact of mining on the general area and the beginning of sale by some individuals promoted further alienation by others. Most notably, the month after IDI was awarded to the Crown, Kawhena Peneamine Rangitu, the owner of 2A2 which had been created by partition in late 1891, offered to hand over the complete management and all the revenues of that block to the Crown for an annual payment:

Finding that all the natives that handed their lands here in Kuaotunu to the Government under the Mining Act as a fact have all sold their lands to the Government, I am the only native here now that is remaining under the mining lease. Dear sir, kindly convey my message to the Government. [F]irst of all I would like them to offer me a lump sum for my block, and by so doing it will take a great responsibility and also worry from me. I meet with so much reverses in guarding the timber upon the property. ... I will surrender the land to them for a lump sum under a new lease, and let them make what they can out of the revenue.16

Such a proposal was not acceptable to Government officials who replied that they would be interested only in the acquisition of the entire freehold. Kawhena apparently tried to hold on, but finally in 1901 was forced to offer to sell partly to raise capital to develop other lands, and in part, because the administration was allegedly neglecting the proper administration of the terms of his mining lease. Gilbert Mair reported:

Kawhena Peneamine Rangitu ... has been to see me and wishes Government to purchase. He states that he is dissatisfied with the manner in which the Gold Revenue is distributed, that for many years proper steps have not been taken to compel miners and other holders to pay what they ought, that the subsequent loss all falls upon him. Moreover he is anxious to improve a valuable block of land he owns near Tikouma, Manaia, where he is now living, hence his urgent wish to dispose of Kuaotunu. He states that the Hon Mr Cadman

14 Under Secretary Native Land Purchase Department to Native Minister, r8 April 1890 & Native Minister file note, on cover sheet to file NLP 1890/87. In ibid., p. 242.

15 Details of this process may be found in ibid., pp. 239-249-

16 Kawhena Rangitu to Resident Magistrate and Mining Warden, 17 April 1896. MA MLP 1902/20. Cited in ibid., p. 259.

6

THE CROWN, THE TREATY, AND THE HAURAKI TRIBES, 1880–1980

sometime ago offered him 10/- an acre per annum, but as he was getting more for Gold Revenue he refused to lease. He thinks now that there is a revival of mining there, Government may prefer to purchase. He asks for £1500 for the whole block. 17

This offer was, however, rejected by the mining warden who informed the Native Land Purchase Department that there was no mining currently being undertaken on the block, claims having been taken up during the boom on speculation only. A portion of Kuaotunu township comprising some 30 business sites was, however, located on the block and a deputation of residents visited the Minister of Justice to complain about the inequality of rents between Native sections and those owned by the Government. They advocated immediate purchase as 'owing to the depression in mining, the natives would be prepared to sell at a reasonable price.'18 The Minister of Lands approved the acquisition, at the price of £400 which had been recommended by the warden. Kawhena agreed and the purchase was notified in 1902. This was quickly followed by the sale of the other Kuaotunu 2 subdivisions which are discussed in more detail in Alexander's block histories for this part of the district.19

Maori ownership of commercial township properties also came under increasing threat as the century drew to a close. The gift of the springs and their willingness to sell adjacent land at a low price had subsidised the development of the area, but by the 1890s their continuing ownership of a few street-front properties in Section 15, Block Ix, which comprised the Morgantown section of the Te Aroha Borough, was seen as detrimental to the town's future progress. The restrictions against alienation of the block had been removed, in 1889, on application of a majority of the owners in order to allow George Lipsey (married to the daughter of the principal right-holder) to purchase, but he succeeded in acquiring one interest only. In 1891 a deputation from the Te Aroha Town Board complained to the Native Minister that no provision had been made to enable the lessees who held tenure under mining resident site licences to secure their freehold at fair value, or for perpetual leases when the restrictions were removed. In response, the Minister directed Wilkinson to see if any interests could be acquired, and over the next ten years, six and a half out of a total of nine shares were purchased.20

The belief that the town's prosperity was dependent on European ownership was strongly expressed in a petition from the Te Aroha Mayor and residents in 1900, urging that the Crown purchase the remaining Maori interests in Morgantown. In part, the request for purchase was inspired by the wish to obtain relief from the higher rents being paid for lease of Maori-owned land at Te Aroha. The petitioners complained that the rents at Morgantown were preserved at the level of £5 in force under the mining legislation in operation at the time of the cession, whereas in the portion of the borough owned by the Crown, rents had been reduced to £3 by subsequent legislation. They believed that

17 Land Purchase Officer to Chief Clerk Native Land Purchase Department, 4 March 1901. MA MLP 2902/20. Cited in ibid., p. 260.

18 Minister of Justice to Native Minister, 14 March 1901. MA MLP 1902/20. Cited in ibid., p. 260.

19 For other purchases involving the question of minerals in this period, see block histories for Te Karaka and Kakatarahae in Alexander, The Hauraki Tribal Lands, Part 1, pp. 260–267.

20 See ibid., pp. 87–89; E.K. Cooper to Minister of Mines, in April 1900. MD 1900/562.

62

Chapter II: Crown Policy and Maori Aspiration, 1890–1914

occupation under mining title with continuing Maori ownership of the freehold was inhibiting growth because there was 'not that strong and secure tenure necessary to promote the advancement of the Town and Baths.'21 An accompanying letter to the Minister of Mines stated that the area was a health and tourist resort rather than a mining town, and that it was necessary to encourage good buildings and maintenance so that overseas visitors would form a favourable opinion.22

It would appear that the Government concurred in these arguments. The Under Secretary of Mines reported in June that action was already being taken, and the Native Affairs Committee, in the following month, declined to make any recommendation on the matter. One half-share was purchased immediately, and the owners of the two remaining shares who did not wish to sell, agreed to a reduction in rent. Within two years, however, the purchase of the whole of Morgantown (294 acres) had been completed.23 These efforts to acquire Maori interests in Section 15, in the first years of the twentieth century, were accompanied by the purchase of remaining Maori blocks within Section 17, comprising Lipseytown. Blocks 5, 15, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, and 24 in Section 17 D2, blocks 12, 13, 14, and 19 in Section 17 D3, and Section 17 D6 were bought by the Crown in 1905; 56 acres in Section 17A, portions in Section 17C, and Section 17 D4 in 1908; and parts of 17D1 (33 acres), 17 A1 (20 acres), 52 acres of 17B, 17A3 (21 acres) in 1910–1917.24 It will be seen in subsequent discussion that this pattern of acquisition of urban commercial properties—in the belief that continuing Maori ownership was detrimental to the economic development of the site, or that such properties should be acquired for the public benefit—was to be repeated elsewhere in the district, at Rawhitiroa, and later in the century, at Thames.

(c) The impact of court and survey costs in the Hauraki Plains

Hauraki leaders had failed to forestall competing surveys of the Hauraki Plains area, and now that the question of title was brought to the Native Land Court, the intricate intermingling and conflicting bases of tribal interests first noted by Drummond Hay and Mackay, in the 1860s and 1870s, meant that each block was fiercely fought over, with many decisions being appealed. At particular issue were the claims of 'original' peoplesNgati Hako and associated groups—as against those of incoming Marutuahu iwi. These claims were based on opposed take of ancestry, occupation, and conquest. That conflict was complicated, too, by the swampy nature of much of the ground in question, evidence of right-holding often involving the use of eel fisheries in which, the Native Land Court later observed, 'there [was] hardly an instance where the witnesses agree[d] as to [who] had the right to any particular fishing place.'25 Alexander's work shows that even after the

21 Petition to Minister of Mines. MD 11900/562.

22 E.K. Cooper to Minister of Mines, 10 April 1900. Ibid.

23 See Rush to Under Secretary Mines Department, 17 October 1900; Under Secretary Mines Department to Warden, 18 August 1902. MD 11900/1430.

24 See Alexander, The Hauraki Tribal Lands, Part 3, pp. 232–234.

25 See Hauraki Minute Book 47, p. 116. Cited in Alexander, The Hauraki Tribal Lands, Part 4, p. 200.

63

THE CROWN, THE TREATY, AND THE HAURAKI TRIBES, 188o-198o

appellate court had decided the question of tribal ownership, disputes continued, and further blocks went to appeal 26 The fate of the blocks lying along the Piako River thus provides a good illustration of what inevitably happened when issues of tribal right were fought through the medium of the Native Land Court. It was over 30 years since the first introduction of the court, but despite the clean up of the worst abuses, an essential problem remained: the mounting of costs as Maori parties attempted to define rights through that forum still resulted in the need to sell land, often when owners were in severely straitened circumstances and in their weakest bargaining position.

The complexities of the bases of claim in the Hauraki Plains area were further revealed over the course of an escalating round of court hearings. As blocks along the lower reaches of the Piako River—for example, Kopuraruwai, Kopuarahi, Koukourahi, Pouarua-Pipiroa, Horahia Opou, and Puhangateuru—came through the court in the 189os, Ngati Hako mounted a strong challenge to the views of their status as a 'conquered people' which had generally pertained as a result of the early Native Land Court cases—at Waihi in which Ngati Hako had thrown in its lot with Ngati Tamatera and elsewhere, in their absence, since they were generally King supporters—and in the context of Mackay's dealings at Ohinemuri and the Thames. Marutuahu, led by Ngati Maru, argued that the peoples described as Ngati Hako remained 'in any occupation or ownership ... only by their permission'.27 But in many of the Piako blocks, Ngati Hako could show before the court their own evidence of early 'conquest' and intermarriage with other peoples—a process which had resulted in an absorption of groups such as Te Uriopou, Waitaha, Nga Marama (Horoawatea) into a group generally known by Hako's name. Above all, they could show the continuing occupation which the Native Land Court considered to be 'the only reliable test of ownership'.28 At Piako, the Native Land Court, in a general sense, accepted the Marutuahu argument that the original tribes remained on the land under their mana, but acted on the principal that 'whatever other theories as to origin and ancestry or any other base of claim', ownership was reliant on proof of occupation. In determining entitlement, the court largely put aside questions of conquest, deciding that 'in whatever way Ngati Maru had acquired a footing in these lands, the evidence of their occupation, such as it was, was undoubted, but that such occupation was intermittent' and 'not equal' to that of the peoples who were 'the admitted permanent residents'.29 Thus, Ngati Hako, Horoawatea, and other peoples whose presence predated that of the Marutuahu, were generally awarded the greater share (a two-thirds portion) as these blocks started to go through the court. The success in 1893 of 'original peoples' at Kopuraruwai, Kopuarahi, Koukourahi, Makumaku, Ngataipua, Tiritiri, Umutawa, and Wairau was followed at Pouarua-Pipiroa in 1895, and elicited a dual response from Marutuahu. While some among Marutuahu seem to have taken a pragmatic view, calling

26 See Anderson, The Crown, The Treaty, and the Hauraki Tribes, 1800--1885, Appendix 5, for schedule of rehearings in 1870-1910.

27 Hauraki Minute Book 52, p. 130.

28 Hauraki Minute Book 52, p. 134.

29 Hauraki Minute Book 52, p. 133.

64

Chapter II: Crown Policy and Maori Aspiration, 1890–1914

on their marriage links with Ngati Hako to establish their claim in these lands, others closely adhered to their original take based on conquest, gift, and occupation.30

The findings for all these blocks were appealed by one or other side, either arguing that they should have received a greater share, or alternatively, that the other side should have received nothing. The cases were reheard in 1896 over the course of hearings lasting from February to September. In general, however, the appellate court upheld the general proportions of the lower court awards, although some adjustments were made. The conflict did not stop here. The same issue had been fought out between Ngati Hako and Ngati Tamatera with reference to Te Awaiti in 1894, and this case was also reheard in September 1896. In the following year, there were further lengthy hearings for Horahia Opou and Puhangateuru, at which Ngati Maru challenged the identity of Ngati Hako as an iwi, arguing that the 'true original occupiers' were Horoawatea (Waitaha, Nga Marama) who had been absorbed into but were still distinguishable from Ngati Hako. According to this argument, Horoawatea came under the authority of Ngati Maru while Ngati Hako proper, who were based further to the south, had been encouraged by their previous successes in court to expand on the boundaries of their early claims.31 Ownership of Otakawe was fought over a further three months of hearings in 1898. The court again divided the shares of all these blocks, but in the case of Otakawe and Puhangateuru, gave the greater portion to Marutuahu—both Ngati Maru and Ngati Whanaunga—rather than the Ngati Hako people. This was because the Court deemed that not only had Marutuahu consistently exercised rights in those land, but also because of the continuing occupation of Horomona's people. These findings were also appealed—by Ngati Hako who again denied any Marutuahu rights in the area at all. The cases were brought to appellate hearing in 1899 and dismissed, but contention over the amendment of the list of owners at Horahia Opou was so great that the Appeal Court had to refer the matter back to the Native Land Court in 1900.

Added to the costs of extensive hearings for Hauraki iwi, were those generated by surveyors who were later described by the land purchase officer in the district as 'rapacious pakehas'.32 The accumulated expense for the tribe could be enormous, resulting in the need to sell far more land than Maori had anticipated. Those groups who had formerly been amongst the most strongly opposed to the land court, survey, and sale, were now, in their turn, seriously affected by the large expenses that were involved in establishing title. Most notable was the debt owed to W.A. Graham and P.E. Cheal, by Ngati Paoa whose court expenses were already considerable as a result of their ownership dispute with Ngati Haua. In 1896 the Supreme Court found in favour of Graham and Cheal for £2597.10.4 in survey costs, against Ngati Paoa based at Te Hoe-o-Tainui, in 13 blocks: Maukoro 1 and 2, Willis' Grant, Takapau-Rerekau, Tauwhare, Ohinearei, Te Whanake, Takapau, Paetoki,

30 See court judgement in Horahia Opou, Hauraki Minute Book 46, p. 209.

31 Hauraki Minute Book 46, p. 209.

32 Mair to Chief Land Purchase Officer, 24 April 1899. MA MLP 1902/68. See Alexander, The Hauraki Tribal Lands, Part 4, p. 43.

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THE CROWN, THE TREATY, AND THE HAURAKI TRIBES, 1880–1980

Kaikupunga, Te Huehue, Te Rangitahoe, and Riwai or Te Ripe. Added to the debt was another £62.15.10 in interest, bringing the total survey debt up to £2796.15.2.33

Much of the title process as the century drew to a close was funded, ultimately, by land alienation out of an ever-diminishing tribal estate, for Maori were fighting a losing battle being unable to realise an adequate price on their remaining lands to meet their debts. Bitter and extended court battles over right-holding meant that both sides lost. Mair summed up the situation, in 1896, commenting on an offer by Haora Tareranui to sell Te Awaiti 4 (600 acres) to the Government, at 7/6d per acre, in order to cover his share of the expenses of the Ngati-Tamatera-Ngati Hako court cases:

I know that this land cost Haora over £200 for Court fees and expenses, and is illustrative of the enormous cost to the natives of putting their lands through the Court, the Ngatihako tribe, who have been awarded considerable areas in the Piako district lately, have paid about 12/- an acre in Court fees, Maori agents, surveys, etc, so that after all their lands are of very little benefit to them.34

Head Office, secure in the Crown's control of purchase operations, rejected Mair's suggestion that Tareranui's price be met in order to reflect improvements in the property from drainage and to allow him to pay off his costs. Mair was instructed accordingly: 'If Haora Tareranui is not satisfied with the price offered for Te Awaiti, he should look up a private purchaser.'35

The Government was able to purchase much of the land on the western side of the Piako River from all the parties of grantees. In the 1896 appeal hearing, it had been arranged that Ngati Kea interests would be divided into two parts at Ngarua: the drier portion was to be retained, while the other swampy half was supposed to pay for the expenses. Mair quickly purchased Ngarua 2 and 4 as well as the portion (no. 3) awarded to Ngati Maru in the person of Taipari, at 6/- per acre, but then extended operations into the rest of Ngarua, acquiring the majority of the remaining no. 2 and 5 blocks (over 6,000 acres) by 1898. This left only a little over 1,100 acres in Ngati Kea's hands. Mair also purchased extensively in the awards of all parties at Pouarua-Pipiroa, acquiring, by 1898, all but 1,050 acres out of the parent block of just under 7,600 acres at the rate of 4/- to 4/6d per acre. In 1901–1902, much of Puhangateuru was sold by all parties involved in the case—a total of some 8,400 acres, leaving only 550 acres to the Maori grantees—and at Otakawe, almost 3,200 acres was purchased by the Government, with only 330 acres remaining in the hands of Hauraki iwi. It will be seen in following sections that the holdings left to Maori as a result of these awards, as well as in the other delta blocks which had gone through the court and appeal process in the 1890s, were also to be acquired by the Crown before the decade was over, either as a result of survey liens, public works legislation, or the application of the Maori Land Settlement Act 1905.

33 Copy of Judgement 3370, 7 January 1896. MA MLP 1902/68.

34 Mair to Chief Land Purchase Officer, 4 November 1896. MA MLP 1905/39. Cited in Alexander, The Hauraki

Tribal Lands, Part 4, p. 7.

35 Chief Land Purchase Officer to Land Purchase Officer Thames, 10 November 1896. Cited in ibid.

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